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Introduction
There is widespread recognition that U.S. households have
changed dramatically in the latter half of the twentieth century.'
The changes include an increased number of blended families, 2
single-parent households, 3 and unmarried same-sex and opposite-
sex committed couples, including some with children. 4 The trans-
formation taking place in U.S. households implicates property law
1. See Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of
Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1311-16 (1997).
2. See ARTHUR J. NORTON ET AL., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P23-
180, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990S, at 1-6 (1992); Jan Lar-
son, Understanding Stepfamilies, 14 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS INC., 1992, at 36, 36, 38.
3. See STACY FURUKAWA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SERIES P70-38, THE DIVERSE LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN:
SUMMER 1991, at 2 (1994).
4. The definition of a committed couple is contested and raises a number of
theoretical, political and practical questions. Does it mean partners who cohabit?
Does it mean partners who are sexually intimate? Does it mean partners who are
financially interdependent? These questions and many others are explored, infra,
in the text accompanying notes 234-265.
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and vice versa. In recognition of the changing U.S. household and
the symbiotic relationship between wealth transmission and fam-
ily, we undertook an empirical study designed to assess public atti-
tudes about the inclusion of surviving committed partners as heirs.
This Article reports our findings.
In 1994, approximately 7% of the nation's couples were in
unmarried committed relationships. 5  Data from surveys of
"unmarried partner households" indicate about 30%, or approxi-
mately 1.7 million, of unmarried households are likely to be
headed by same-sex couples. 6 The number of opposite-sex commit-
ted relationships is growing at a more rapid pace than the number
of same-sex relationships. Opposite-sex households increased at a
28% rate between 1990 and 1994 as compared to just 4% for same-
sex households.7 A significant minority of same-sex couples
(between 8 and 9%) and an even greater percentage of opposite-sex
couples (35%) have children under the age of fifteen living with
them.8
Coincidental with the changes occurring in U.S. households is
an increase of public and political attention to issues relating to
sexual orientation. The increased attention has led to greater
support, or at least greater societal tolerance, for lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and transgender persons (LGBT). It has also led, how-
5. See ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SERIES P20-484, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH
1994, xiii (1996) [hereinafter CPS].
Sociologists Larry Bumpass and James Sweet have conducted numerous
studies on cohabitation that primarily focus on opposite-sex couples. See LARRY L.
BUMPASS & JAMES A. SWEET, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE AND UNION STABILITY:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM NSFH2, 6 (Center for Demography and Ecology,
Univ. of Madison-Wis., Nat'1 Survey of Families and Households Working Paper
No. 65, May 1995). According to their data, "about half of the population under
age 40 have [sic] lived with an unmarried partner-in ten years that will be true
for the population under age 50." Id. at 8. What is striking about the data is that
it shows increases in the percentage of unmarried persons currently cohabiting
across ages between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. For persons interviewed
between the ages of 35 and 39, the percent of unmarried couples cohabiting in-
creased from about 17% in 1987-88 to about 22% in 1992-94. See id. at tbl.2, fig.4.
For persons between the ages of 45 and 49 the increase was less dramatic (about
13% as compared to about 16%). See id. For persons between the ages of 50 and
54, however, the increase went from about 4% to about 16%. See id.
6. American Demographics Inc., One-third of Unmarried Partners Are Gay,
THE NUMBER NEWS, May 1996, at 1, 1 (basing these numbers on surveys in which
the householder reported "being one of two partners of the same sex").
7. See id.; see also Monica A. Seff, Cohabitation and the Law, 21 MARRIAGE &
FAMILY REV. 141, 143-46 (1995) (reviewing the literature estimating the extent of
cohabitation by opposite-sex couples in the United States, considering the difficul-
ties involved in measurement and explaining the possible reasons for the increase
in cohabitation by opposite-sex couples).
8. See CPS, supra note 5, at tbl.8.
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ever, to increased hostility. Today, the news media commonly pro-
files lesbians and gay men and their issues,9 the census bureau
tracks households based on the gender of the parties,10 and a
number of municipalities and corporations extend benefits to their
employees' domestic partners, which can include partners of the
same-sex." At the same time, however, we also are not surprised
to find Congress enacting the Defense of Marriage Act,12 which de-
nies federal recognition of same-sex marriages and allows states
not to recognize same-sex marriages authorized in other states.' 3
9. See Gerald Lubenow et al., Gays and Lesbians on Campus, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 5, 1982, at 75, 75; Ramon G. McLeod, Group Urges Gays, Lesbians to Be
Counted in Census, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 15, 1990, at A15; Eloise Salholz
et al., The Power and the Pride, NEWSWEEK, June 21, 1993, at 54, 54; Joseph P.
Shapiro & Stephen Gregory, Kids with Gay Parents, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 16, 1996, at 75, 75; Alex Witchel, At Lunch with Chastity Bono; Growing Up
in Public: From Babe in Arms to Gay Advocate, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1997, at Cl.
10. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1996, at 57, tbls.64, 65 (116th ed. 1996).
11. See Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of
"Family," 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 101-05 (1990-1991). Santa Cruz and West Holly-
wood, California and Seattle, Washington have extended health benefits along
with sick and bereavement leave to city employees' domestic partners. See id. at
101-02 n.32. Other cities, including Madison, Wisconsin and Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, have extended sick and bereavement leave only. See id. Berkeley and San
Francisco, California are among several municipalities that have a formal domes-
tic partnership registration scheme that provides unmarried committed couples
with a "relationship" approximating marriage. See id. Many corporations, law
firms and universities, including Apple Computer, HBO, IBM, Levi Strauss Corp.,
Microsoft Corp., Viacom International, Walt Disney, Shearman & Sterling, Skad-
den, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, the University of Iowa and the University of
Pittsburgh also provide domestic partnership benefits to their employees. See Jeff
Barge, More Firms Offer Benefits for Gay Couples: Managers Say Fairness Con-
cerns Prompted Change: Low Cost Was a Surprise, A.B.A. J., June 1995, at 34; Los
Angeles County Bar Ass'n, The Los Angeles County Bar Association Report on Sex-
ual Orientation Bias, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 297, 336 n.170 (1995);
Mary Deibel, Boycotted Disney Late on Same-Sex Benefits, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, July 7, 1996, at B2; David W. Dunlap, Gay Partners of I.B.M. Workers to
Get Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, at A18; Marlynne Pitz, Pitt To Provide
Benefits for Same-Sex Partners, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 10, 1993, at Al.
12. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West Supp. 1997); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997).
13. See 1 U.S.C.A. § 7; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C. The issue of same-sex marriage
has gained particular public prominence as a result of the Hawaii Supreme Court's
decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The court found that the
state was denying same-sex couples the right to marry based on the sex of the ap-
plicants. See id. at 59-60. In accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Hawaii Constitution, HAW. CONST. art I, § 5, the court held that the state was re-
quired to demonstrate a compelling state interest why same-sex couples should be
denied the right to marry. See id. at 67. It remanded the case for trial to hear
evidence on that issue. See id. at 68. The trial court ruledin late 1996 that the
state had failed to meet its burden of showing that prohibiting same-sex couples
from marrying was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See Baehr v.
Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The
court granted the state's motion to stay the ruling pending an appeal to the Hawaii
[Vol. 16:1
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In addition, the federal government and all but a small minority of
states permit discrimination in employment, housing, lending,
education and public accommodation based on a person's sexual
orientation.14 The broad range of social and legal responses to
various issues concerning sexual orientation indicates that some
issues are more controversial than others and that any legal
change acknowledging same-sex committed relationships is likely
to engender substantial debate.
Until recently, one area in which there has been little or no
legislative or political attention regarding committed couples has
been that of intestacy laws. The increasing prevalence of commit-
ted relationships is reason enough to ask whether state intestate
Supreme Court. See 65 U.S.L.W. 2399. In the meantime, the Hawaii legislature
has passed a bill calling for a constitutional amendment to authorize the legisla-
ture to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples. See H.R. 117, 19th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Haw. 1997). The state has also enacted a broad domestic partnership law.
See infra notes 22-28, 140-158 and accompanying text.
In a preemptive effort to prevent having to recognize Hawaii same-sex mar-
riages, a substantial number of states have enacted anti-same-sex marriage bills.
See Hawaii Seeks Law to Block Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1997, at A15
[hereinafter Hawaii Gay Marriages] (reporting that as of April 1997, 18 states had
enacted laws not to recognize same-sex marriage). In 1996, the federal govern-
ment also took preemptive action by enacting the Defense of Marriage Act, 1
U.S.C.A. § 7; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C. The Act allows states to refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages of another state. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 738C. It also provides
that the term "marriage" as used in all federal statutes or agency rulings, regula-
tions or interpretations means "only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife" and the term "spouse" means "only ... a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." 1 U.S.C.A. § 7. Same-sex married
couples, therefore, would not be treated as married for purposes of federal taxa-
tion, immigration or other federal programs.
A related development is the continuing possibility that Hawaii will hold a
constitutional convention, depending on the outcome of a case currently on appeal
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Bruce Dunford, Assoc. Press, Sept. 10,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2548469 (describing the Hawaii Supreme Court's
holding invalidating a vote favoring holding a constitutional convention and a fed-
eral district court's order of a December 6, 1997 special election on whether there
should be a constitutional convention, which the Ninth Circuit ordered not take
place pending the appeal).
14. As of August 1997, only eight states-California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Vermont, Wisconsin-and the District of
Columbia, prohibit by statute discrimination based on sexual orientation. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a-r
(West Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501, -2502, -2512 (1992 & Supp. 1997);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (Supp. 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1997); id. ch. 272, § 92A (Law. Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1)-(5), (7)-
(8), (8a) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 963
(1996); id. tit. 8, §§ 1211, 1302, 4724 (1993 & Supp. 1997); id. tit. 9, §§ 2362, 2488,
4502, 4503 (1993); id. tit. 21, §§ 495, 1726 (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.765,
21.35 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); id. §§ 66.395, .432 (West 1990); id. §§ 101.22,
111.31 (West 1988); id. § 230.18 (West 1997).
In 1996, a bill proposing to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion, see S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996), failed in the U.S. Senate.
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statutes need reform. Two recent developments make exploration
of intestacy laws even more timely. The first is a 1995 tentative
statutory proposal made by Lawrence Waggoner, a preeminent
scholar of wills and trusts who is a national leader in probate re-
form. 15 The proposal (hereinafter referred to as the Waggoner
Working Draft) would amend the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) by
providing an intestacy share for a surviving committed partner.16
It establishes qualifications for a committed partner, including a
listing of factors that, if one or more are present, raise a presump-
tion in favor of finding the claimant to be a committed partner.
17
It applies to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Under the
proposal a committed partner is given the right to share a dece-
dent's intestate estate in an amount that varies depending on
whether the decedent is also survived by children or parents.'
8
The approach to determining the statutory share of the committed
partner is modeled after the 1990 UPC's spousal share, but the
amounts recommended are less than the amounts that a legal
spouse would have a right to receive under the UPC.19 Professor
Waggoner made the draft tentative pending the results of this em-
pirical study, appreciating that legislatures and bar associations
might be more receptive to a proposal to reform intestate statutes
to include a committed partner if it is supported by an empirical
study.
The second development occurred in 1997 in Hawaii. In re-
sponse to Baehr v. Lewin 02 and Baehr v. Miike,21 which found that
the state's prohibition of same-sex marriage violated the Constitu-
tion of the State of Hawaii, 22 the Hawaii legislature reached a po-
15. Lawrence Waggoner is the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Prop-
erty (Wills and Other Donative Transfers). He is also the Director of Research of
the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which is a supervi-
sory body that monitors the UPC. He was the Chief Reporter of the revisions to
Article II of the UPC, which were promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1990.
16. See Appendix, Waggoner Working Draft, infra pp.192-94 [hereinafter Ap-
pendix]. An earlier version of the statutory proposal is found in Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REV. 21 (1994).
17. See Appendix, §§ (b)-(f), infra pp. 92-94 (listing requirements for qualifica-
tion as a committed partner and defining the strength of the presumption).
18. See Appendix, § (a), infra p. 92. The amount that the committed partner
receives also depends on whether the decedent's children are the children of the
committed partner and on whether the committed partner has children that are
not the children of the decedent. See Appendix, § (a), infra p. 92.
19. See Table 1 infra p. 26; infra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.
20. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
21. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
22. See supra note 13 (discussing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), and
Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)).
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litical compromise that included calling for a constitutional
amendment authorizing the legislature to restrict marriage to op-
posite-sex couples. 23  Along with this proposed constitutional
amendment, the legislature enacted a domestic partnership act
that the governor allowed to become law without his signature.24
The act permits same-sex couples to register as "reciprocal benefi-
ciaries." 25  It extends to "reciprocal beneficiaries" many of the
benefits of marriage, including the right to inherit under the
state's intestacy statute the same share that a surviving legal
spouse receives and the right to elect an elective share that is the
same as that available to a surviving legal spouse. 26 To take under
the intestacy statute, the same-sex partners must have signed a
"declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relationship;" to take under
the elective share statute, the partners must have registered the
declaration with the state director of health.27 Hawaii has enacted
the UPC and therefore the amount the reciprocal beneficiary re-
ceives under the intestacy statute varies depending on whether
the decedent also is survived by children or parents.28 In this re-
gard, the Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act and the Waggoner
Working Draft are similar.
Within the context of Baehr v. Lewin and Baehr v. Miike, the
reciprocal beneficiaries legislation is a major setback for same-sex
couples seeking the right to marry.29 Judged within the context of
the prevailing law in the United States, however, the Hawaii leg-
islation is ground breaking. The Waggoner Working Draft and the
Hawaii legislation present two different approaches for defining a
committed partner and reforming a state's inheritance statutes to
allow a committed partner to share in a decedent's estate. In this
23. A Bill for an Act Proposing a Constitutional Amendment Relating to Mar-
riage, H.R. 117, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997). The proposed constitutional
amendment was filed with the Office of Elections on July 22, 1997, and will be
placed on the general election ballot in November 1998. See Who Will Be First with
Same-Sex Marriage: Hawaii or the Netherlands?, LESBIAN / GAY L. NOTES, Nov.
1997, at 163.
24. Act Relating to Unmarried Couples (Reciprocal Beneficiaries), ch. 383,
1997 Haw. Sess. Laws § 1 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-1 to -7
(Michie Supp. 1997)).
25. See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-4 to -5 (Michie Supp. 1997).
26. See id. §§ 560:2-102, 2-201 to -214.
27. See id §§ 560:2-102, 2-201.
28. See id. § 560:2-102; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A.
105-06 (Supp. 1997). The amount that the reciprocal beneficiary receives also de-
pends on whether the decedent's children are also the children of the reciprocal
beneficiary and on whether the reciprocal beneficiary has children that are not
also the children of the decedent. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-102 (3)-(4)
(Michie Supp. 1997).
29. See Hawaii Gay Marriages, supra note 13, at A15.
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Article we will evaluate the two approaches to intestacy law re-
form based on our empirical findings.
Intestacy statutes serve multiple functions.30 They reflect so-
ciety's commitment to: (1) donative freedom; (2) equity, meaning
concerns about fairness and protection of reliance interests; and
(3) family. At the same time that intestacy statutes reflect social
norms and values, they also shape the norms and values by recog-
nizing and legitimating relationships. 31 Over the last few hundred
years, they have continually changed to reflect and support socie-
tal changes.3 2 In making the transition from feudalism to liberal
democracies, Britain and Europe began in the eighteenth century
to develop new ideologies. The Enlightenment idea of the rational
man unconnected to a bloodline or community was a cornerstone of
liberalism.3 3 Primogeniture,3 4 dower,3 5 and curtesy3 6 eventually
gave way to the inclusion of a spouse and nonmarital and adopted
children as heirs of a decedent's property. 37 The history of gradual
30. See G.D.H. Cole, Inheritance, in 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
35-43 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1932); 1 RICHARD T. ELY,
PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
425-32 (1914); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspec-
tive, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY
REPORT 9, 14-15 (Edward Halbach, Jr., ed., 1977); LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE DEAD HAND 6-21 (1955).
31. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE,
LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 4-34 (1989);
ALISON REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND
OF THE LAW OF WILLS: DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION
67-90 (1928).
32. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
33. Cf. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE
POLITICS OF MEANING 2-6 (1993).
34. "The superior or exclusive right possessed by the eldest son, and particu-
larly, his right to succeed to the estate of his ancestor, in right of his seniority by
birth, to the exclusion of younger sons." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1191 (6th ed.
1990).
35. "A species of life-estate, which a woman is, by law, entitled to claim on the
death of her husband, in the lands and tenements of which he was seised in fee
during the marriage .... Id. at 492.
36. "The estate to which by common law a man is entitled, on the death of his
wife, in the lands or tenements of which she was seised in possession in fee-simple
or in tail during her coverture, provided they have had lawful issue born alive
which might have been capable of inheriting the estate. It is a freehold estate for
the term of his natural life." Id. at 383.
37. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, 2-114 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A.
105-06, 114-15 (Supp. 1997). In the United States, rejection of the preference of
males over females and of primogeniture among male descendants began during
the colonial period. See Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheri-
tance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1977). Re-
form of intestacy laws, including the elimination of primogeniture in virtually all
of the states in favor of a rule that treated the children equally, reflected the influ-
[Vol. 16:1
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change reveals not only the fact of change but also the values and
criteria that have supported change. Reforms to inheritance laws
can be attributed consistently to legislative efforts to honor dona-
tive intent whenever possible, strive for equality and fairness and
strengthen the family.38
With these three criteria in mind, we designed a telephone
survey that the Minnesota Center for Survey Research adminis-
tered to four sampling groups of Minnesota residents: the general
public, persons in opposite-sex committed relationships, women in
same-sex committed relationships and men in same-sex committed
relationships. The primary purpose of the survey was to gather
data to assist in answering the following two questions: Should a
decedent's surviving committed partner be an heir? How should a
statute define a committed partner for purposes of determining
whether that partner should inherit from the decedent? To be able
to provide more comprehensive answers to these questions, we in-
cluded questions about the family units headed by committed
partners. Specifically, we explored public attitudes about treating
a partner's child as an heir and the implications of those findings
on the question of the committed partner as an heir.
The implications of allowing a decedent's committed partner
to take under an intestacy statute are different for opposite-sex
and same-sex couples. For opposite-sex couples, their sexual ori-
entation is part of the dominant culture. Therefore, the recogni-
tion of committed partners in an intestacy statute has the benefit
of validating those relationships but carries with it less symbolic
implications than it does for same-sex couples. What is most likely
predominantly at stake for most opposite-sex couples is whether
the intestacy statute reflects their likely intent, treats the partners
fairly and strengthens their family ties. For some opposite-sex
couples, however, heirship rights risk assimilation into a marriage
model that the partners might have chosen to reject because of its
patriarchal roots. For them, change in the intestacy laws poten-
tially presents a double bind.
For same-sex couples, values-in addition to donative intent,
fairness and familial ties-are even more likely to be at stake. On
ence of the political tradition of republicanism. See id. at 12-13. The preambles to
the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary acts governing inheritance expressed
the republican abhorrence of aristocracy, family dynasties and large estates. See
id. at 14-15. For further discussions of the relationship between early American
inheritance law and republican political ideology, see Gregory S. Alexander, Time
and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273
(1991), and Katz, supra.
38. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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one hand, inclusion leads to treating same-sex relationships the
same as married couples and, therefore, has the potential of dis-
rupting systemic subordination based on sexuality. Statutory re-
form may not only validate the couple's relationship but also may
validate individual identity. On the other hand, inclusion risks
reinforcing the heterosexual model of marriage by extending rec-
ognition only to those who come close to duplicating it. Intestacy
reform raises the principled, as well as the pragmatic, question of
whether recognition of a committed partner will assist only those
who are already close to the center of power and conformity. 39
Part I describes current law.40 Section A explains the impli-
cations of extending heirship rights to committed partners by ex-
amining the purpose and design of intestacy statutes.41 Section B
summarizes court-recognized rights of committed partners to each
other's property using traditional legal and equitable theories in
this nontraditional setting.42 It then considers the benefits of in-
cluding committed partners as heirs under intestacy statutes. Sec-
tion C outlines the Waggoner Working Draft and the Hawaii leg-
islation, describing various aspects of each and indicating the
similarities and differences between the two approaches.43
Part II presents the findings of the survey.44 Section A de-
scribes the method and design of the survey.45 Section B first de-
tails the findings when respondents were presented with a set of
scenarios involving committed partners and were asked to deter-
mine who should share in the decedent's estate and to what ex-
tent.46 It then considers the findings when respondents were
asked a series of questions that were designed to develop a defini-
tion of a "committed relationship" and a "committed partner."47
Based on the data, we are able to draw some limited conclusions
and suggest directions for further research. 48
39. See Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian & Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of
Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 63, 78 (1991)
("juxtaposing widespread legalistic and feminist criticisms of marriage as an insti-
tution with the fact of lesbian and gay momentum toward inclusion in the institu-
tion").
40. See infra notes 54-160 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 54-91 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 117-160 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 161-265 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 161-174 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 175-233 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 234-265 and accompanying text.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 263-265.
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Part III further investigates the committed partner as heir by
considering the family unit headed by committed partners and,
most especially, in the context of inheritance, the parental nature
of the relationship between committed partners and their partners'
children.49 Section A describes the laws that determine parent-
child relationships and how they affect committed couples with
children.50 Section B first details the findings when respondents
were presented with a set of scenarios involving a partner's child.5'
It then considers, through analysis of the findings, the effect a
parent-child relationship between a decedent and the partner's
child might have on the definition of a committed partner relation-
ship, as well as the effect a committed partner relationship might
have on the definition of a parent-child relationship.52 The Article
concludes by summarizing the major findings of the study and
considering the legal and social implications of including commit-
ted partners as heirs.53
I. Legal Treatment of Committed Partners
A. Intestacy Law
1. Objectives
Article II of the UPC by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1969,54 and its sub-
sequent revision in 1990, 5 have served as catalysts for reexamina-
tion of existing intestate succession laws. The UPC pattern of
distribution inevitably is a product of the tradition and history
that has influenced other intestacy statutes. The drafters of the
UPC, however, were careful not to perpetuate historical rules that
they found to be inconsistent with modern attitudes. Their goal
was to design a statute that reflects the donative intent of persons
who die without wills. 56 By reflecting probable donative intent of
49. See infra notes 266-341 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 267-295 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 296-325 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 326-341 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 342-350 and accompanying text.
54. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983).
55. See id. 8 U.L.A. 101 (Supp. 1997).
56. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. I (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 104 cmt.
(Supp. 1997); id. at 56 cmt. (1983).
The drafters' objectives correspond to the rationale that is commonly ascribed
to intestacy laws today. This rationale is expressed in the following passage:
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those likely to die without a will, the intestacy statute furthers tes-
tamentary freedom because it gives persons the right not to have
to execute wills to assure that accumulated wealth passes to their
intended takers. 57
Effectuating probable intentions of decedents, however, is not
the only objective of intestacy statutes. A second objective of intes-
tacy statutes is to produce a pattern of distribution that the recipi-
ents believe is fair and thus does not produce disharmony among
expectant takers or disdain for the legal system. 58 Rooted in a pa-
triarchal tradition, historically inheritance laws were not con-
cerned with principles of equality. Today, however, it is no longer
acceptable to treat an eldest son as more deserving of the family's
wealth than his siblings, nor is it acceptable to treat adopted chil-
dren differently than biological children, or nonmarital children
differently than marital children.5 9
The question of fairness goes beyond issues of equality. Fair-
ness also includes equity considerations of financial dependence,
reliance, unjust enrichment and trust.60 Based on these considera-
tions, there is widespread acceptance of the right :of a surviving le-
gal spouse to receive a substantial share of a decedent's estate,
even when the decedent is survived by children.61
Our laws concerning intestate succession are designed to effect the
orderly distribution of property for decedents who lack either the
foresight or the diligence to make wills. The purpose of these stat-
utes . . . is to provide a distribution of real and personal property
that approximates what decedents would have done if they had
made a will.
King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87-88 (W. Va. 1983)
57. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates,
Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code-Part 1, 7
LAND & WATER L. REV. 169, 176 (1972); Earl M. Curry, Jr., Intestate Succession
and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of Article II of the Uniform Probate Code and
the Law of Ohio, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 114, 116 (1973); William J. Fratcher, Toward
Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1047 (1966); Thomas J.
Mulder, Intestate Succession under the Uniform Probate Code, 3 PROSPECTUS 301,
301, 306 (1970); Daniel H. O'Connell & Richard W. Effland, Intestate Succession
and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of the Law of Arizona and the Uniform Probate
Code, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 209 (1972).
58. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 34 (2d ed. 1997).
59. Inheritance statutes consistently provide for equality among children and
permit adopted and nonmarital children to inherit. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§§ 2-103 (1), -106, -114 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 107, 109, 114-15 (Supp. 1997).
60. See 1 ELY, supra note 30, at 431-43.
61. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1)(ii), (3)-(4) (amended 1993), 8
U.L.A. 105-06 (Supp. 1997).
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A final objective of intestacy laws is to promote and encour-
age the nuclear family. 62 Historically, the family has been a highly
valued institution viewed as of great benefit to a stable and pro-
ductive society.63 Indeed, the safeguarding of families and family
life is a value that continues to shape policy and political debate
today.64
The difficulty, of course, arises in defining family. One of the
central ways that families have been valued and privileged is
through the institution of marriage and its accompanying legal,
social and religious significance. As Lawrence Friedman notes,
"family," for the purposes of intestacy, has meant a married couple
and children of the marriage.
Rules of inheritance and succession are, in a way, the genetic
code of a society. They guarantee that the next generation
will, more or less, have the same structure as the one that
preceded it .... Rules favoring wives and children reinforce
the nuclear family. Any radical change in the rules, if carried
out, will radically change the society. 65
Marriage and marital families are deeply rooted in Western
tradition. Legal regulation of marriage and divorce discourages
nonmarital relationships directly by denying unmarried couples
the benefits of marriage provided by the state. It also discourages
nonmarital relationships indirectly by creating a privileged cate-
gory of legitimate relationships. This leads to nonmarital relation-
ships being characterized as abnormal at best and as deviant at
worst.
6 6
62. Two other objectives also have been identified. The first is to avoid compli-
cating property titles and excessive subdivision of property. See 1 ELY, supra note
30, at 431; Cole, supra note 30, at 36. The second is to encourage the accumula-
tion of property by individuals. See 1 ELY, supra note 30, at 431-32; Cole, supra
note 30, at 37-43. These objectives raise no peculiar issues with regard to inheri-
tance rights for surviving committed partners and therefore will not be discussed.
63. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the
Family in American Law and Society, 2 UTAH L. REV. 387, 390-91 (1993).
64. See id.; David L. Chambers, The "Legalization" of the Family: Toward a
Policy of Supportive Neutrality, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 805 (1985); Looking for
a Fainily Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Defini-
tion of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991).
65. Friedman, supra note 30, at 14. For further support for this point, see 1
ELY, supra note 30, at 431.
66. See Fineman, supra note 63, at 392 n.12 (citing Speeches from the Federal-
ist Society Fifth Annual Lawyers Convention: Individual Responsibility and the
Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1012, 1016 (1992)).
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As demonstrated in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Michael
H. v. Gerald D.,67 the primary justification for support of marriage
is tradition. 68 The case involved a California statute treating any
child born to a married woman as the child of her husband.6 9 A
majority of the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.7 0
In reaching its decision, the plurality opinion, written by Justice
Scalia, relied upon historical traditions, 71 meaning "the historic re-
spect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-
traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the
unitary family."7 2 Rejecting more generalized traditions such as
"family relationships" or "emotional attachments," Justice Scalia
wrote:
We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradi-
tion protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right
can be identified. If... there were no societal tradition, either
way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child adul-
terously conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible)
reason from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in gen-
eral. But there is such a more specific tradition, and it un-
qualifiedly denies protection to such a parent.73
The inheritance law objective of supporting the nuclear fam-
ily becomes highly contestable given the historical context of mar-
riage. One view would be that the intestacy statute is one compo-
nent of a state's statutory scheme to support the tradition of
marriage. Within this view, recognition of inheritance rights for
surviving committed partners is inconsistent with the objectives of
an intestacy statute because it would devalue marriage. Another
view would be that the intestacy statute is part of a state's statu-
tory scheme to support family functions, such as child rearing and
mutual financial responsibility. Within this understanding of in-
testacy, a recognition of inheritance rights for surviving committed
partners would further the state's objectives. Persons holding this
view presumably would acknowledge the possibility that recog-
nizing committed partners as heirs could undermine marriage.7
4
67. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that an unwed biological father has no paren-
tal rights with respect to his child if the mother of the child is married to another
man at the time of the child's birth).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 113.
70. See id. at 131-32.
71. See id. at 123.
72. Id. at 123.
73. Id. at 127 n.5.
74. Cf. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW
& SEXUALITY 9, 17 (1991) (arguing that the institution of marriage is challenged
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Perhaps some would even welcome that possibility.7 5 Yet another
view is to consider any retrofitting of inheritance laws to include a
committed partner as more likely to result in persons in committed
relationships conforming to traditional family norms. Although
persons holding this view might appreciate the potential for chal-
lenging the tradition of marriage through amendment of intestacy
statutes, they nevertheless would conclude that the more likely
consequence is that the change will reinforce the dominance of the
marriage tradition.7 6
We do not suggest, of course, that this highly contested ques-
tion is resolvable through the present study. We do suggest, how-
ever, that assessing public attitudes regarding the status of mar-
riage can assist in evaluating the potential benefits and costs of
changing the intestacy law to include a committed partner as an
heir.77
2. Treatment of Committed Partners
Under prevailing statutory law, the surviving committed
partner does not share in the decedent's intestate estate. The
property of the decedent passes to the decedent's lineal descen-
dants (children, grandchildren, etc.).78 If the decedent is not sur-
vived by any lineal descendants, the property passes to the dece-
dent's parents, if any, or to the descendants of the parents.79
New Hampshire80 and Oregon 81 have enacted a limited ex-
ception to this prevailing statutory law. Both states have codified
and changed by allowing same-sex marriage because it undermines the linkage of
certain roles to a certain gender).
75. See id.
76. Cf. Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1
LAW & SEXUALITY 31, 34 (1991) (advancing similar argument regarding same-sex
marriage); Dunlap, supra note 39, at 78 (raising concerns about reinforcing dis-
crimination in the context of considering the consequences of same-sex marriage);
Ruthann Robson, Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbians in Legal Theory, 19
SIGNS 975, 983 (1994) (explaining the limits of subversiveness in a context where
traditional heterosexual marriage remains the standard for determining eligibil-
ity).
77. See infra notes 177-233 and accompanying text (describing the preferences
of respondents when presented with scenarios in which the decedent was survived
by a committed partner and members of the family in which the decedent was born
and scenarios in which the decedent was survived by a committed partner and
children).
78. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(1) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 107
(Supp. 1997).
79. See, e.g., id. § 2-103(2), (3), 8 U.L.A. 107.
80. "Persons cohabiting and acknowledging each other as husband and wife,
and generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and until the decease of
one of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally married." N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1992).
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a statutory version of common-law marriage applicable only at
death.82 The statutes provide that under certain circumstances a
81. The relevant Oregon provision reads as follows:
For purposes of [intestate succession], a person shall be considered the
surviving spouse of a decedent under either of the following circum-
stances:
(1) The person was legally married to the decedent at the time
of the decedent's death.
(2) The person and the decedent, although not married but ca-
pable of entering into a valid contract of marriage under ORS
chapter 106, cohabited for a period of at least 10 years, the pe-
riod ended not earlier than two years before the death of the
decedent, and:
(a) During the 10-year period, the person and the decedent
mutually assumed marital rights, duties and obligations;
(b) During the 10-year period, the person and the decedent
held themselves out as husband and wife, and acquired a
uniform and general reputation as a husband and wife;
(c) During at least the last two years of the 10-year period,
the person and the decedent were domiciled in this state;
and
(d) Neither the person nor the decedent was legally married
to another person at the time of the decedent's death.
OR. REV. STAT. § 112.017 (Supp. 11 1996); see id. § 106.010 (1990) (defining mar-
riage as a "civil contract entered into in person by males at least 17 years of age
and females at least 17 years of age," thereby excluding a lesbian or gay surviving
partner from qualifying as a spouse under the statute).
As originally enacted in 1993, OR. REV. STAT. § 112.017 reads as follows:
For purposes of [intestate succession], a person shall be considered
the surviving spouse of a decedent if:
(1) The person was legally married to the decedent at the time
of the decedent's death; or
(2) (a) The person and the decedent lived together for at least
10 years;
(b) The person and the decedent represented themselves,
and conducted their affairs, as husband and wife; and
(c) The decedent was not legally married to another person
at the time of the decedent's death.
Act of Aug. 4, 1993, ch. 598, 1993 Or. Laws 1508.
82. Common-law marriage is currently available only to opposite-sex couples.
Most states have abolished common-law marriage by statute. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-3-1.1 (Supp. 1997) (providing that common-law marriages entered into
after January 1, 1997, are not recognized); IDAHO CODE § 32-201 (1996) (providing
that common-law marriages entered into after January 1, 1996, are not recog-
nized). Only eleven states (Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah) and the Dis-
trict of Columbia still recognize common-law marriages. But see IOWA CODE ANN. §
595.11 (West Supp. 1997) (validating marriage but requiring the parties to the
marriage and "persons aiding or abetting them" to pay $50 cash to state); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (1995) (recognizing marriage if it meets certain statutory
requirements, which are modeled generally on traditional common-law marriage
requirements). For a general discussion of the requirements necessary to estab-
lish a common-law marriage, see Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family? In-
heritance and the Taxation of Inheritance within the Non-Traditional Family, 24
IDAHO L. REV. 353, 361 (1987-1988).
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surviving partner of an opposite-sex committed relationship
should be treated as a legal spouse for inheritance law purposes.
Both states require the decedent and the surviving partner to have
been cohabiting, but New Hampshire only requires cohabitation
for three years, 83 whereas Oregon requires cohabitation for ten
years. 84
The exclusion of surviving committed partners as heirs has
been challenged unsuccessfully in court. The surviving gay part-
ner of the decedent in In re Petri challenged the constitutionality
of New York's inheritance statute because it precluded him from
inheriting the estate of his deceased partner.8 5 The court held that
the inheritance statute was not violative of the surviving partner's
rights under either the state or federal constitutions, but it sug-
gested that denying a marriage license to same-sex couples may be
unconstitutional.8 6
A similar challenge to New York's elective share statute also
failed.8 7 A surviving committed partner was successful, however,
in obtaining the same rent and eviction protections accorded the
"surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of
the deceased tenant's family who has been living with the tenant
[of record]."88 In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., the New York
Court of Appeals held that the surviving gay partner of a deceased
tenant was entitled to statutory rent and eviction protections.8 9
Both the successful and unsuccessful litigation just described
had to do with legislative recognition of the rights of a committed
partner.90 The next Section discusses a growing body of law that
allocates rights and obligations between partners using contract
law and equitable principles. 91 To a large extent, these cases may
also be read as protecting individual claimants rather than ongo-
ing family units headed by committed partners.
83. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39.
84. See OR. REV. STAT. § 112.017.
85. See N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29.
86. See id. But see Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 286 (Sup. Ct. 1996)
(holding that marriage in New York is limited to opposite-sex couples and that the
gender classification serves a valid public purpose).
87. See In re Estate of Cooper 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Term. 1993), appeal
dismissed, 624 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. 1993).
88. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting the
regulations in effect in New York City pertaining to rents and evictions).
89. See id.
90. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
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B. Property Rights of Committed Partners outside of
Inheritance Law
The law in most jurisdictions gives effect to express contracts
entered into by committed partners.92 Through agreement, the
partners can define the ongoing committed relationship in terms of
living arrangements, income pooling, support and maintenance
and parenting responsibilities.93 Contracts also can provide for the
distribution of property in the event the relationship ends other
than by death of one of the partners. 94 Although persons in com-
mitted relationships can protect their respective interests under
current law through private agreements, the protections fall short
of the predictability and enforceability provided to persons who are
married. 95
92. For recent discussions of the effectiveness of contracts between committed
partners, see Mike McCurley, Same-Sex Cohabitation Agreements, in PREMARITAL
AND MARITAL CONTRACTS 195 (Edward L. Winter & Lewis Becker eds., 1993); Mar-
garet F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (1994)
(reviewing MILTON C. REGAN, JR.; FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY
(1993)); Kristin Bullock, Applying Marvin v. Marvin to Same-Sex Couples: A Pro-
posal for a Sex-Preference Neutral Cohabitation Contract Statute, 25 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1029 (1992); Christensen, supra note 1, at 1341-48; Raymond C. O'Brien,
Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163
(1995).
93. See, e.g., Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
("The State is not thusly condoning the lifestyles of homosexuals or unmarried
live-ins; it is merely recognizing their constitutional private property and contract
rights."). The agreements may require the execution of other legal documents,
such as durable powers of attorney, health care directives, wills and the like. See,
e.g., Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (discussing an agreement requiring a will be
executed).
94. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). Couples cannot con-
tract to simulate other marital rights, such as personal injury damages, joint cus-
tody of one partner's child or U.S. citizenship for a foreign partner. See David L.
Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of
Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 458-59, 463-65, 484-85
(1996).
95. As one lawyer who specializes in gay and lesbian issues observes, "I used to
say, 'Why do we want to get married? It doesn't work for straight people,' ....
[b]ut now I say we should care: They have the privilege of divorce and we don't.
We're left out there to twirl around in pain." Kirk Johnson, Gay Divorce: Few
Markers in This Realm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at A20. For a list of the tangi-
ble benefits of marriage, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and
the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745,
786 (1995).
One rarely used and controversial method for obtaining legal recognition of
rights between committed partners is for one partner to petition to adopt the
other. Compare Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1993) (permitting the
adoption) with In re Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d at 427 (denying the adoption). See
also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 5-101, 9 U.L.A. 75 cmt. (1997) (favoring the approach
adopted in In re Robert Paul, 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984), stating that "[ilf a rela-
tionship other than that of parent and child is intended, the adoption may be de-
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A substantial body of case law has developed regarding the
enforcement of express or implied agreements between committed
partners and the imposition of equitable remedies in the absence
of mutual agreement.96 For the most part, plaintiffs are most suc-
cessful when the courts treat the committed couples as having cre-
ated the equivalent of business, rather than familial-type, ar-
rangements and treat any agreements having to do with sexual
relations as severable from the agreement they are enforcing. 97 In
nied"); cf. First Nat'l Bank of Dubuque v. Mackey, 338 N.W.2d 361 (Iowa 1983)
(holding that daughter's "friend" whom daughter adopted should not be included
as a member of the class named in the mother's trust absent evidence that the
adopted adult had an in loco parentis relationship with the adopter).
96. The most famous of the so-called "palimony" cases is Marvin, 557 P.2d
106., in which the court held that Michele Triola's complaint based on an express
or implied contract stated a cause of action and that it could be amended to include
the equitable theories of constructive trust, resulting trust or quantum ineruit.
See id. at 122. On remand, Triola failed to prove the existence of an express or
implied contract, but the trial court awarded her $104,000 for rehabilitation on the
ground of an unspecified equitable theory. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr.
555, 556 (Ct. App. 1981). On appeal, the judgment granting this award was re-
versed for want of a "recognized underlying obligation in law or in equity." Id. at
559; accord, e.g., Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995) (en banc)
(relying on the state's marital dissolution statutes for determining the appropriate
division of property); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990) (allowing equi-
table property division in cases of heterosexual unmarried cohabitants even
though common-law marriage could not arise by operation of law in West Vir-
ginia).
Although most of the cases have involved property disputes between living
committed partners who have separated, some cases have involved contractual or
equitable claims by a surviving partner to a share of a decedent's estate. Com-
plaints founded upon breach of oral promises supported by social, domestic, nurs-
ing and business services have been held to state a cause of action. See, e.g., Poe v.
Estate of Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (considering public policy
in the enforcement of an express support contract); Donovan v. Scuderi, 443 A.2d
121 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (discussing expenditures and services provided by
companion); Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (examining
the validity of an oral agreement to convey a house). Complaints also have been
held to state a cause of action when they sought the imposition of a constructive
trust on specific property based on a confidential relationship between the domes-
tic partners. See, e.g., Poe, 411 So. 2d at 253. In addition, complaints seeking
damages in the amount of the value of services on the theory of quantum meruit
have been upheld. See, e.g., Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1975)
(concerning services rendered by plaintiff in reliance of descendant's oral promise);
Williams v. Mason, 556 So. 2d 1045 (Miss. 1990) (same); Humiston v. Bushnell,
394 A.2d 844 (N.H. 1978) (same); Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. 1980)
(same). Moreover, complaints seeking the imposition of an implied partnership
with respect to a business arrangement have been upheld. See, e.g., Bass v. Bass,
814 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn. 1991) (granting judgment for cohabitant which entitled her
to one half of partnership assets); Estate of Thornton, 499 P.2d 864 (Wash. 1972)
(involving a cohabitant of 16 years with four children).
97. See Marvin, 557 P.2d 106; Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct.
App. 1988); Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Watts v. Watts,
405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987).
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other words, the price paid for the limited recognition of commit-
ted relationships that emerges out of the case law is that the cir-
cumstances of the couples' lives are distorted. Although the right
to contract has proven to be an incomplete legal response to the
needs of persons in committed relationships, 98 the limited protec-
Several courts have refused to follow Marvin because they disagreed that the
sexual nature of the relationship was severable. The court in Rehak v. Mathis,
stated that:
It is well settled that neither a court of law nor a court of equity will lend
its aid to either party to a contract founded upon an illegal or ininoral
consideration .... The parties being unmarried and the appellant having
admitted the fact of cohabitation in both verified pleadings, this would
constitute immoral consideration ....
238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977). An Illinois court expressed a similar policy:
Illinois' public policy regarding agreements such as the one alleged here
was implemented long ago .... where this court said: 'An agreement in
consideration of future illicit cohabitation between the plaintiffs is void.'.. .The
issue, realistically, is whether it is appropriate for this court to grant a le-
gal status to a private arrangement substituting for the institution of
marriage sanctioned by the State. The question whether change is needed
in the law ... [is best left to] the legislative branch ....
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Ill. 1979). In Thomas v. LaRosa, 400
S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 1990), the court denied recovery because the appellant had
known that the appellee was married:
The type of 'business consulting services' appellant alleges that she
performed ... are typical of the services performed by most wives
who are in the good graces of their husbands. Finally, traveling
with and entertaining for a man are not such services that a court
can determine to be so distinctly business-related as to be entirely
separable from illegal meretricious consideration.
Id. at 814; see also Bergen v. Wood, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 78 (Ct. App. 1993) ('The
agreement is unenforceable because the parties did not cohabit and therefore no
consideration by [the plaintiff] existed severable from the sexual relationship.").
Several other courts have refused to follow Marvin because they refused to
recognize an implied contract. See Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980);
Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Estate of Alexander, 445
So. 2d 836 (Miss. 1984); Dominguez v. Cruz, 617 P.2d 1322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980);
Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980); see also Posik v. Layton, 695 So.
2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (relying on Florida's Statute of Frauds, which
requires that contracts made upon consideration of marriage be in writing, indi-
cating that a writing requirement should also apply to "non-marital, nuptial-like
agreements"). In Minnesota, an express written contract "between a man and a
woman who are living together . . . out of wedlock" is valid, even if "sexual rela-
tions between the parties are contemplated." MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075, .076 (1996).
It also provides, however, that in the absence of an express written contract, any
claim to another's earnings or property must be dismissed as contrary to public
policy if it is "based on the fact that the individuals lived together in contemplation
of sexual relations and out of wedlock within or without this state." Id.
98. We recognize that private law making through contract is sometimes use-
ful. See LENORE WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS AND THE
LAw 246-331, 360-417 (1981); Elizabeth Kingdom, Cohabitiation Contracts and
Equality, 18 INT'L J. Soc. L. 287, 295-97 (1990).
[Vol. 16:1
COMMITTED PARTNERS
tions and benefits available through private law making have
themselves become the basis for arguing for greater public rights.99
One underlying problem with relying on contract law is that
the cost of obtaining legal advice to accomplish the contract may be
prohibitive for some couples and lead to postponement for others.
A second problem is that the benefits of an agreement are realized
only when conflicts arise. Up to that time, especially in the early
period of a committed relationship, partners are likely to discount
its value and have very little interest in defining their respective
rights. A third problem is that, even if the partners have entered
into an express contract, at the end of the relationship, either
during life or at death, the agreement may not reflect changes and
oral arrangements. Later developments, therefore, can lead to the
agreement becoming irrelevant, inappropriate or inadequate.
A final problem is that one partner may have greater bar-
gaining power than the other because of age, financial situation,
gender or emotional commitment. 100 If the partners do enter into
a contract, it is likely to be one that favors the partner in a domi-
nant position and may be no more than the nondominant partner
waiving all rights to the dominant partner's property.1 01 As Mary
Becker has discussed in a recent article, power differentials in
bargaining operate differently for opposite-sex and same-sex com-
mitted couples. 0 2 For opposite-sex couples, gender-based power
differentials are likely to operate to the disadvantage of women in
committed relationships who must bargain for rights. 103 In con-
trast, for same-sex couples, social and economic disparities are less
likely to favor one partner consistently over the other. 0 4 Another
major difference in contract making by opposite-sex as opposed to
same-sex couples is that an agreement between partners of the
99. See Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities:
Not Heaven, But Not Hell Either, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996).
100. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1537-38 (1983) (criticizing the use of inter-
personal contracts by married couples and cohabiting couples because they pro-
mote individualism rather than altruism and because they are likely to reflect and
perpetuate inequalities within the relationships); see also Ruthann Robson & S.E.
Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63
TEMP. L. REV. 511, 520-28 (1990) (analyzing the role of contracts within lesbian
relationships and in the development of lesbian legal theory, showing how contract
theory "imports the considerable power of the patriarchal state into lesbian exis-
tence").
101. See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 67-68.
102. See Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73
DENy. U. L. REV. 1169, 1170-71, 1173-74 (1996).
103. See id. at 1170.
104. See id. at 1171.
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opposite sex is undertaken within the context that the couple has
recourse to legal marriage. 10 5 The decision not to marry operates
to the advantage of the more socially and economically powerful
partner. 106 Any agreement entered into by the couple regarding
property rights is likely to result in less, and not more, protection
than the other partner would obtain through the marriage and
dissolution laws. 107 In contrast, the absence of the alternative to
marry for same-sex couples becomes the impetus for entering into
contracts that provide protection to a partner who is relatively
economically vulnerable.10 8 Private contract making by same-sex
committed couples, therefore, has a greater potential for serving
the mutual interests of both partners. 10 9
Concern about unequal bargaining power, other practical
limits of a private ordering scheme, unjust enrichment and ineffi-
ciencies of a case-by-case resolution led Waggoner to consider re-
form of the intestacy law. 10 By including a surviving committed
partner as an heir, the intestacy scheme would reflect decedents'
intent to have their partners share in their probate estates and it
would also establish a social norm that a partner should have a
share in a decedent's estate." Recognition of the partner as an
heir, therefore, has the potential to prevent or reduce unjust en-
richment and sharp bargaining by setting a standard of fair treat-
ment. Recognition of the partner as an heir also has the benefit of
providing more security to the couple's private arrangements, be-
cause contestants will have less to gain if they contest wills, will
105. See id. at 1174.
106. See id. at 1173.
107. See id. at 1170-71, 1173-74.
108. See id. at 1173-74.
109. Whether enforcement of contracts made between same-sex partners should
be viewed as a positive development is a contested issue. Mary Becker argues that
it can be seen as a positive development only if it is disassociated from the fact
that recognition of contracts made between same-sex partners is a byproduct of the
courts having recognized contracts made between opposite-sex partners, which has
had the regressive effect of disadvantaging heterosexual women. See id. at 1175.
She concludes that the potential of contract law to serve same-sex couples is se-
verely limited because the enforcement of private ordering that reinforces gender
hierarchies inevitably reinforces heterosexism. See id. at 1174-75. Martha Ert-
man, in contrast, argues for both theoretical and practical reasons that enforce-
ment of contracts made between same-sex couples has the potential to do more
good than harm and has the potential to be a "way station" on the way to recogni-
tion of public rights. See Ertman, supra note 99, at 1154-67.
110. See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 71-78.
111. See id. at 78.
[Vol. 16:1
COMMITTED PARTNERS
substitutes or other contractual arrangements based on assertions
of undue influence. 1 2
Waggoner recognized, however, that the counterpart in the
area of wills to the contract cases would be some form of an elec-
tive-share statute." 3 Such a provision would give a surviving
committed partner the right to claim a portion of the decedent's
probate and nonprobate estates in contravention of the decedent's
intent. It would recognize the partner's right to support as well as
the partner's contribution to the decedent's acquired wealth.
Without an elective-share type statute, the potential for unjust en-
richment remains.
Notwithstanding the benefits of protecting a surviving com-
mitted partner through an elective-share type statute, Waggoner
began by working on the intestate share.11 4 Without ruling out the
possibility of extending elective-share rights to committed part-
ners, Waggoner believed that the intestacy statute was "the easiest
place to start," because it can be based on the imputed intent of the
decedent. 115 A proposal for including a committed partner as an
heir can be defended politically as facilitating individual donative
freedom and as being remedial in nature. In that sense, including
112. See Lamborn v. Kirkpatrick, 50 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1935); In re Will of Kauf-
mann, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965); ARTHUR S. LEONARD, SEXUALITY AND THE LAW:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LEGAL CASES 664-71 (1993); Joseph W. deFuria, Jr.,
Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Meretricious Relationships: Undue Influence or
Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 200 (1989); Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PiTT. L. REV. 225 (1981);
Jane Birnbaum, Gay Partners' Problem: Passing on Their Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 1994, at 31. But see Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Ct. App. 1990)
(reasoning that the will, which had named the decedent's partner as a devisee, was
not an "unnatural will" in a will contest by the decedent's brother); Evans v. May,
923 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (declining to hold that the devisee's "30-
year relationship as the decedent's 'lifemate' constitutes undue influence as a mat-
ter of law" and finding that the testator's sister, who was contesting the will, pro-
vided no other evidence to establish the elements of undue influence at trial).
The current law of undue influence raises particularly serious problems for
the gay community when a gay partner, who dies of AIDS, leaves a will devising a
substantial portion of his estate to his surviving partner who cared for him during
his illness. Legal advocates report that challenges to the wills of their AIDS pa-
tients have been on the rise. See Trent J. Thornley, The Caring Influence: Beyond
Autonomy as the Foundation of Undue Influence, 71 IND. L.J. 513, 514 (1996);
Carol Angel, Legal Challenges to AIDS Patients' Wills Seem on Rise, L.A. DAILY J.,
Aug. 16, 1988, at 1. As Trent Thornley put it, "acts of care become evidence of un-
due influence" under current law. Thornley, supra, at 515. Thornley also dis-
cusses how the law of undue influence is based on a theory of autonomy, meaning
a view "of society as merely a collection of free-thinking, rational beings," and how
that theory produces inappropriate results. Id. at 529-31.
113. See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 78.
114. See id. at 78, 87.
115. Id. at 78.
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a surviving committed partner as an heir under an intestacy stat-
ute can be seen as an intermediate step between private and pub-
lic rights." 6 The next Section describes the Waggoner Working
Draft in greater detail, as well as the Hawaii reciprocal beneficiary
legislation, which does provide same-sex committed partners the
protection of an elective share.
C. Recent Legislative Developments
1. The Waggoner Working Draft
Waggoner's proposal, last revised in 1995, is put forward as
an amendment to the UPC's intestacy statute.11 7 It has two parts:
(1) determining the intestacy share passing to the surviving com-
mitted partner and (2) defining who is a surviving committed
partner.11 8 The share passing to the committed partner varies de-
pending on who else survives the decedent." 9 If the decedent is
survived by a parent or a child who is not also the child of the sur-
viving committed partner, then the committed partner receives
one-half of the decedent's probate estate. 120 If all the decedent's
children are also children of the surviving committed partner, the
partner also receives only one-half of the probate estate if the
partner has a child who is not also a child of the decedent. If,
however, the decedent is not survived by a parent or children or if
all the children of the decedent are also the children of the sur-
viving partner and that partner had no other children, then the
partner receives the first $50,000 plus one-half of the balance, if
any, of the probate estate.' 2' This means that, for intestate de-
116. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 1318-25 (analyzing gay and lesbian fam-
ily law in terms of the "alternative approaches to the legal ordering of gay and les-
bian family identity").
117. See Appendix, infra p. 92-94.
118. See Appendix, infra p. 92-94.
119. See Appendix, § (a), infra p. 92.
120. See Appendix, § (a), infra p. 92. The Waggoner Working Draft refers to lin-
eal descendants rather than children. By doing so, the proposal addresses the
problem of a child predeceasing the decedent leaving grandchildren, great-
grandchildren, etc. For ease of discussion, we are describing the proposal exclu-
sively in terms of surviving children.
121. See Appendix, § (a), infra p. 92. For example, if a decedent died leaving a
probate estate of $125,000 survived by children from a prior relationship and a
partner who also had children from a prior relationship, then the surviving part-
ner would receive one-half of the decedent's estate or $62,500. If all the decedent's
children had been children of the surviving partner and if the partner had no chil-
dren from a prior relationship, then the surviving partner would receive the first
$50,000 plus one-half of any balance of the probate estate or $87,500.
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cendents with relatively modest estates, their committed partners
receive all or nearly all of their estates.
The approach for determining the intestacy share for the
committed partner is modeled after the UPC's approach for deter-
mining the intestacy share for legal spouses. The UPC provides
less to a spouse when a decedent is survived by a parent but no
children than when the decedent is not survived by a parent.
122 It
also provides less to a spouse when the spouse has children from a
prior relationship than when the spouse's children are also the de-
cedent's children. 123 As Table 1 shows, the amount passing to the
surviving spouse in each of these situations, however, is more than
the amount passing to the surviving committed partner. For ex-
ample, the surviving spouse receives the entire probate estate if
the decedent is not survived by a parent or if the decedent is sur-
vived by children who are also the children of the spouse and the
spouse has no children from a prior relationship. If the decedent is
survived by a parent but no children, the surviving spouse receives
the first $200,000 plus three-fourths of the remaining balance of
the probate estate.
Waggoner explained he was recommending that a relatively
smaller share pass to committed partners "in recognition of the
competing claims of the decedent's blood or adoptive relatives, and
to some extent to maintain the incentive to enter into a formal
marriage."'124 The smaller share also avoids the appearance that
the statutory proposal is reintroducing common-law marriage.
25
He readily recognized that arguments can be made for increasing
the share passing to the committed partner and welcomed debate
on this issue. In this regard, he suggested that "consideration
should be given to granting a larger intestate share, perhaps the
same share a spouse would take, to a surviving de facto partner
who, because of gender, was prohibited by law from marrying the
decedent."126
122. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 106 (Supp.
1997).
123. See id.
124. Waggoner, supra note 16, at 80.
125. See id. at 80-81.
126. Id. at 80 n.143.
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Table 1. Comparison of Intestate Estate to Spouse under
UPC and Intestate Estate to Partner under Waggoner
Working Draft
Family UPC §2-102 Waggoner Working
Circumstances Draft
No children or parent 100% of estate $50,000 plus one-half of
any balance of the
estate
All of decedent's 100% of estate $50,000 plus one-half of
children are also any balance of the
children of the estate
spouse/partner and the
spouse/partner has no
other children
No children but parent $200,000 plus three- one-half of the estate
fourths of any balance
of the estate
All decedent's children $150,000 plus one-half one-half of the estate
are also children of the of any balance of the
spouse/partner and the estate
spouse/partner also has
other children
One or more of the $100,000 plus one-half one-half of the estate
decedent's children are of any balance of the
not children of the estate
spouse/partner
The second part of the proposal defines who is a surviving
committed partner. 127 The challenge under the approach adopted
in the Waggoner Working Draft is to identify easily applied crite-
ria that will accurately identify committed partners. The proposal
denies committed-partner status to anyone who at the time of the
decedent's death is married, a minor, prohibited from marrying
under the law of the state by reason of a blood relationship to the
decedent and who was not sharing a common household with the
decedent. 128 The first three of these criteria raise few, if any, fac-
tual disputes.129
127. See Appendix, § (b), infra p. 92.
128. See Appendix, § (b), infra p. 92.
129. One could imagine, however, an allegation that a person claiming to be a
committed partner was a common-law spouse of another person or that a divorce
was invalid.
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The proposal imposes one further requirement in determin-
ing whether a person qualifies as a surviving committed partner-
that person must have been in a "marriage-like relationship" with
the decedent. 130 There is a substantial benefit of using marital
relationships as the standard for evaluating the degree of com-
mitment and the likelihood that the decedent would have intended
the person to share in the estate; it is a standard familiar to the
courts and one they likely will feel comfortable applying.13 1 It has,
however, unpredictable political implications. Conferring mar-
riage-like status may generate political resistance to the proposal
by some who hold traditional attitudes toward marriage. For quite
different reasons, a statutory requirement that insists on commit-
ted couples "mimicking" marriage may be politically unappealing
to LGBT communities. They might reason that it increases the po-
tential of reinforcing heterosexual norms. It also may be problem-
atic for some opposite-sex couples who have rejected marriage be-
cause of its patriarchal underpinnings. 132  Alternatively, the
standard may make the proposal more politically acceptable be-
cause it embraces familiar constructs. It is difficult to predict
which reaction is likely to prevail.
Within this construction of the "marriage-like relationship,"
the proposal adopts three related definitional techniques. 133 First,
it establishes a general definition of a "marriage-like relationship"
The criteria of "sharing a common household" could be problematic. The part-
ners could have separate households because, for example, they are not employed
in the same city or because one of the partners requires nursing home care. The
draft addresses this question effectively by providing that "sharing a common
household" means that the partners "shared the same place to live," regardless of
whether "one or both had other places to live" and regardless of whether "one or
both were physically residing somewhere else at the decedent's death." Id. § (c).
This language, along with accompanying commentary to the statute, should give
the courts sufficient guidance to apply this requirement functionally, not literally.
See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 81 n.145. The explanatory language recognizes
the complex living arrangements that couples may have at different times during
their lives. It is broad enough to include a person who did not cohabit with the
decedent. For example, access to a decedent's home along with the storing of some
pieces of clothing and toiletries may be sufficient for a finding that the couple
shared a place to live. The most salient point to be made about the proposal's ap-
proach is that it leaves flexibility to the courts, allowing them to apply on a case-
by-case basis the requirement "share the same place to live" narrowly or broadly,
depending likely on whether the claimant can provide an explanation for why the
couple did not cohabit.
130. Appendix, § (d), infra pp. 92-93.
131. Cf. Butch v. Forte, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1983) (using marriage as
the standard by which to evaluate a relationship for purposes of a claim for loss of
consortium) (discussed infra note 234).
132. See supra pp. 9-10 (speculating that intestacy laws may reinforce the tradi-
tional marriage model that some opposite-sex couples reject).
133. See Appendix, § (d), infra pp. 92-93.
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that refers to two individuals "who share one another's lives in a
long-term, intimate and committed relationship of mutual car-
ing."134 Second, it sets out a number of objective factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether the general definition has been
met with a warning that no single factor or set of factors should be
viewed as determinative. 135 The factors include duration, inter-
mingling of finances, participation in a commitment ceremony and
one or both individuals naming the other as a primary beneficiary
of life insurance. 136 Third, the proposal creates a presumption in
favor of finding a marriage-like relationship if any one of the fol-
lowing factors is met: (1) that the couple shared a household for at
least five years during the six-year period preceding the decedent's
death; (2) that the decedent or the individual registered the other
as a domestic partner; (3) that "the decedent and the individual
joined in a marriage or commitment ceremony;" or (4) that "the in-
dividual is the parent of a child of the decedent, or is or was a
party to a written co-parenting agreement with the decedent...
and if, in either case, the child lived," while under the age of 18,
with the decedent and the individual in a common household. 13
7
The presumption in favor of finding a marriage-like relationship
can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence if more than
one of the four listed factors is met.138 The presumption can be re-
butted by a preponderance of the evidence if only one of the four
listed factors is met.139
By using a combination of three techniques to determine
whether an individual qualifies as a surviving committed partner,
the proposal minimizes the risk of over- and underinclusion. At
the same time that it gives the courts objective factors and proce-
dural rules with which to reduce evidentiary controversies, it also
allows courts to look at the totality of circumstances to determine
whether a decedent and an individual claimant had been in a
committed relationship. Some may argue with the factors listed
and want to include more, fewer, or different ones, and some may
argue that certain factors should be made prerequisites to finding
that an individual qualifies as a committed partner. What is diffi-
cult to argue is that the combination of definitional techniques
proposed will likely lead to injustice. The approach presents the
134. See Appendix, § (d), infra pp. 92-93.
135. See Appendix, § (d), infra pp. 92-93.
136. See Appendix, § (d) (1)-(6), infra p. 93.
137. See Appendix, § (e), infra p. 93.
138. See Appendix, § (f), infra p. 94.
139. See Appendix, § (f), infra p. 94.
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best chance that a deserving individual will obtain heir status and
that an undeserving individual will not.
2. The Hawaii Legislation: The Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act
Effective July 1, 1997, Hawaii enacted legislation recognizing
reciprocal beneficiaries. 140 The stated purpose of the Reciprocal
Beneficiaries Act "is to extend certain rights and benefits which
are presently available only to married couples to couples com-
posed of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying
under state law."141 The legislation establishes the requirements
of a reciprocal beneficiary relationship142 and then amends, among
many other statutes, the inheritance laws to extend to reciprocal
beneficiaries the same rights accorded legal spouses. 143 The pri-
mary qualifications of a reciprocal beneficiary relationship are that
each of the parties be adults; that they be unmarried, not a party
to another reciprocal beneficiary relationship, legally prohibited
from marrying under Hawaii law and that they sign a declaration
of reciprocal beneficiary relationship that they then may file with
the director of health. 144
Hawaii's approach of relying exclusively on self-identification
avoids the definitional issues addressed in the Waggoner Working
Draft. 145 Its limitation, however, is that it provides no inheritance
rights for couples who fail to sign a declaration, even when there is
substantial and convincing evidence that a committed relationship
existed between the decedent and another person. 146 This under-
inclusiveness is particularly troubling because it may tend to oper-
140. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (Michie Supp. 1997); see supra notes
24-28 and accompanying text (discussing Hawaii's intestacy law that is extended
to same-sex couples).
141. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-1.
142. See id. §§ 572C-4 to -5.
143. See Act Relating to Unmarried Couples (Reciprocal Beneficiaries), ch. 383,
1997 Haw. Sess. Laws §§ 2-41.
144. See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-4 to -5. A "declaration of reciprocal
beneficiary relationship" is defined as "a statement in a form issued by the director
[of health] that declares the intent of two people to enter into a relationship. By
signing it, two people swear under penalty of perjury that they meet the require-
ments for a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship." Id. § 572C-3.
145. The benefit of the Hawaii approach is that it will not force committed part-
ners into "potentially damaging attempts to calibrate their lives to conform to het-
erosexual models." Robson & Valentine, supra note 100, at 539. For further dis-
cussion of the two approaches, see infra notes 260-265 and accompanying text.
146. If the couple has not signed a written declaration, Hawaii's Reciprocal
Beneficiaries Act raises the question whether courts will be less willing to recog-
nize the contractual and equitable claims of one same-sex committed partner
against the other. See supra Part I.B (discussing property rights of committed
partners outside of inheritance law).
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ate to the advantage of the more socially and economically power-
ful partner.147
Opposite-sex committed partners are not prohibited from
marrying under state law and therefore are ineligible to be recip-
rocal beneficiaries. 48  The qualifications, however, are broad
enough to allow persons who are related to each other to qualify,
such as a parent and child.' 49 The inclusion of couples who are
related to each other biologically or through adoption undermines
the recognition of same-sex committed relationships as uniquely
intimate, emotional attachments and therefore supports rather
than disrupts subordination based on sexual orientation.150
Through this law, the state is asserting its regulatory powers
over committed relationships by establishing eligibility require-
ments and a filing procedure. 15' It is also asserting its regulatory
powers by treating the reciprocal beneficiary relationship as ter-
minated if one of the parties to the relationship marries or if either
files a declaration of termination.152  Within this regulatory
scheme, the rights and obligations of reciprocal beneficiaries under
Hawaii's inheritance law mirror those available for persons who
are legally married.
The reciprocal beneficiary receives the same share of a dece-
dent's estate as a surviving spouse would receive under the intes-
tacy statute.153 The beneficiary is also entitled to a homestead al-
lowance, exempt property and a family allowance. 54 Consistent
with its approach of treating a surviving reciprocal beneficiary the
same as a legal spouse for inheritance purposes, the legislation
provides reciprocal beneficiaries an elective share155 and an intes-
147. Cf. supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text (discussing the greater
bargaining power one partner may have over the other).
148. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (3). Given the fact that opposite-sex
partners are not eligible to file as reciprocal beneficiaries, it would seem that the
courts would continue to allow them to pursue contractual and equitable claims
against each other or each other's estates. See supra Part I.B.
149. See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-2 (using the example of "a widowed
mother and her unmarried son").
150. The inclusion of familial relationships also makes implementation of the
act complex and creates a number of ambiguities. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to critique in detail this aspect of the Hawaii legislation, but we urge its
further consideration.
151. See id. §§ 572C-4 to -5.
152. See id. § 572C-7.
153. See id. § 560:2-102.
154. See id. §§ 560:2-402 to -404.
155. See id. §§ 560:2-201 to -214. For purposes of claiming an elective share, the
reciprocal beneficiary must be a party to a registered reciprocal beneficiary rela-
tionship. See id. § 560:2-201.
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tacy share if the decedent entered into the reciprocal beneficiary
relationship after executing a will.156 The rights accorded surviv-
ing reciprocal beneficiaries are all subject to the relationship not
being terminated before the decedent's death. 15 7 The Act also pro-
vides that individuals' dispositions contained in donative instru-
ments, including wills, to their reciprocal beneficiaries or to rela-
tives of their beneficiaries are revoked upon termination of the
reciprocal beneficiary relationships. 158
The Waggoner Working Draft and the Hawaii legislation pre-
sent two different approaches to defining committed relationships
for the purpose of determining who is eligible to be an heir of a de-
cedent. They also provide for different shares of the decedent's in-
testate estate passing to the committed partner. 59 The details of
both approaches are evaluated below on the basis of the findings of
an empirical study assessing public attitudes about including
committed partners as heirs. 160
II. Assessing Public Attitudes about Treating Committed
Partners as Heirs
A. Method and Design
In the fall of 1996, survey data were collected by the Minne-
sota Center for Survey Research (MCSR) at the University of Min-
nesota. Telephone surveys were completed by 256 Minnesota resi-
dents, including a sample of the general public, and three samples
of persons in unmarried committed relationships: 1) persons with
opposite-sex committed partners, 2) women with same-sex com-
mitted partners, and 3) men with same-sex committed partners.
Interviewers indicated that they were calling from the University
of Minnesota and told respondents they were conducting a study to
assess attitudes about the inheritance rights of couples who are
living together without being married. For the general public
sample, MCSR used random digit dialing to generate a random
156. See id. § 560:2-301.
157. See id. § 560:2-802 (stating the effect of divorce, annulment, decree of sepa-
ration and termination of reciprocal beneficiary relationship on the intestacy, elec-
tive share, omitted spouse, homestead, exempt property and family allowance pro-
tections).
158. See id. § 560:2-804. This provision affects donative transfers to a partner's
child who is not also a child of the donor. See infra notes 267-295 and accompa-
nying text (discussing how the current law of intestacy defines parent-child rela-
tionships).
159. See Table 1 supra p. 26.
160. See infra Parts II.B, III.B.
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sample of persons over age 25 residing in the state. Respondents
were selected randomly from household members 25 years and
older. In several cases, respondents were in unmarried committed
relationships and were incorporated into the committed partner
samples. Thus, the general public sample does not include persons
in unmarried committed relationships. The final size of the gen-
eral public sample was 87, with a response rate of 57%.161
The sample of persons with opposite-sex committed partners
was generated by asking respondents in the general public sample
to provide the name and phone number of someone they knew in
an opposite-sex committed relationship. The final sample size was
33, with a response rate of 74%. Due to the difficulties in gener-
ating random samples of same-sex committed couples, 162 we solic-
ited volunteers for these samples. We placed flyers in bookstores,
cafes, bars and other businesses in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Min-
nesota that the LGBT communities support. We also contacted
LGBT advocacy groups throughout the state, including groups at
the University of Minnesota, and asked for their help in generat-
ing names. A few radio stations and newspapers ran community
service ads about the study. Finally, names were generated by
word-of-mouth as our acquaintances became aware of our project.
The final sample size for men with same-sex partners was 51
yielding a response rate of 88%, and for women with same-sex
committed partners the sample size was 85 yielding an 81% re-
sponse rate.
Table 2 compares the demographic characteristics of the gen-
eral public sample and the samples of respondents with committed
partners with state population data. 163 Just over 37% of the re-
spondents in the general public sample had bachelor's degrees.
The comparable figure for the state of Minnesota for persons 25
161. While this response rate is lower than that obtained in some public sur-
veys, it is to be expected given the nature of the topic. Inheritance rights for com-
mitted relationships deal with issues of sexuality, mortality and property; three
topics persons may be reluctant to discuss with a stranger.
162. To draw a random sample of same-sex committed couples, we would need a
sampling frame or a list of all eligible people from which to draw. Because very
few persons are in same-sex relationships relative to the population of the United
States and because very few persons are willing to identify themselves as lesbian,
gay, bisexual or transgender to a poller over the phone due to fear of discrimina-
tion, random digit dialing is not a feasible means of identifying potential respon-
dents. In one national phone survey, for example, 1650 calls were made to Kan-
sas, a total of 55 hours of dialing, before pollers spoke with a person willing to
identify as being a gay man or a lesbian. See Chambers, supra note 94, at 449 n.3
(citing Larry Hatfield, Methods of Polling, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 5,
1989, at A20).
163. See Table 2 infra p. 34.
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and older was 21.8% in the 1990 census. 164 The average personal
income in our sample of the general public falls between $25,000
and $30,000 for 1995. This average is slightly over the personal
income per capita in Minnesota, which was $21,495 for 1995.165
The proportion of white respondents in our sample is comparable
to the proportion of whites in the state's population. 166 In the gen-
eral public sample, 92% of respondents were white while the figure
for Minnesota as a whole is 94.5%.167
In comparison to the general public sample, the respondents
with opposite-sex partners were younger, more of them had earned
a bachelor's degree, and they had slightly higher personal in-
comes. 168 In our samples of respondents with same-sex partners,
we see striking differences in comparison to the general public
sample. 169 Much of this is likely due to the way in which we ob-
tained our sample, which focused for practical reasons in the Twin
Cities and at the University, generating a sample of more liberal
and more educated persons. 170 Nearly 93% of the women and 84%
of the men in these samples had bachelor's degrees. 171 They were
slightly younger than the general public sample, 172 and earned
higher personal incomes. 73 Although not shown, this sample is
also more likely to be from large cities in Minnesota and more
likely to be comprised of individuals who identify themselves as
Democrats.
164. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION & HOUSING: SUMMARY SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND HOUSING CHAR-
ACTERISTICS: MINNESOTA 88 tbl.3 (1992).
165. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at 453 tbl.699 (116 th ed. 1996).
166. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS, MINNESOTA 1990, at 16 tbl.4 (1993).
167. See id.
168. See Table 2 infra p. 34.
169. See Table 2 infra p. 34.
170. See Thomas C. Wilson, Urbanism, Migration, and Tolerance: A Reassess-
eient, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 117, 122 (1991).
171. See Table 2 infra p. 34.
172. See infra note 191 (examining the effect of age on distributive preferences).
173. See Table 2 infra p. 34.
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Table 2. Comparison of Survey Respondents with State
Population by Demographic Characteristics
Minnesota General Respondents Female Male
Population Public with Respondents Respondents
Sample Opposite-Sex with Same- with Same-
Partners Sex Partners Sex Partners
Age n/a 49.3 36.5 41.5 40.3
Graduated 21.8 37.3 60.6 92.9 84.0
from
college (%)
Mean $23,118 5.9 6.2 7.4 7.9
income'
White (%) 94.5 92.0 90.9 96.5 90.0
Sample n/a 87 33 85 51
Size (N)
Response n/a 57 74 81 88
Rate (%)
1 Income was measured in the study by the following scale: 1=$5,000; 2=$5,000-
10,000; 3=$10,000-15,000; 4=$15,000-20,000; 5=$20,000-25,000; 6=$25,000-30,000;
7=$30,000-35,000; 8=$35,000-40,000; 9=$40,000-50,000; 10=$50,000-60,000;
11=$60,000-70,000; 12=$70,000 and over.
We used a self-definition of committed relationship for eligi-
bility. Not all of our respondents in committed relationships were
cohabiting with their partner. Eleven (33.3%) respondents with
opposite-sex partners, five (5.9%) female respondents with same-
sex partners and 3 (6.0%) male respondents with same-sex part-
ners were not living with their partners.
All of the respondents were presented a series of scenarios in
which they were asked to divide the property of the decedent
among survivors identified by their familial-type relationship with
the decedent.17 4 Respondents were told that they could leave the
entire estate, any portion of the estate, or none of the estate to any
of the survivors identified in the scenario. All the scenarios in-
174. See Scenario A infra p. 37; Scenario B infra p. 41; Scenario C infra p. 47;
Scenario D infra p. 49; Scenario E infra p. 73; Scenario F infra p. 74; Scenario G
infra p. 76; Scenario H infra 79.
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volved a committed partnership that terminated as a result of the
death of a partner. The scenarios described the decedent and sur-
viving partner or decedent and predeceased partner as being of the
opposite sex. The first scenario, however, was repeated describing
the decedent and decedent's partner as being of the same sex. For
all the remaining scenarios, respondents were asked if the way in
which they distributed the decedent's estate would differ if the
partner had been of the same sex as the decedent. In addition, re-
spondents were asked whether unmarried couples who live to-
gether in a committed relationship should be treated the same as
married couples under inheritance laws.
For respondents in a same or opposite-sex committed rela-
tionship, additional information was gathered regarding their per-
sonal relationships, wealth accumulation and children. If respon-
dents had entered into written property agreements with their
partners, we gathered information on the nature of their agree-
ments. Demographic information was gathered on all respon-
dents. Sixteen pre-test interviews were conducted by MCSR to as-
sess the length and comprehension level of the questionnaire. The
average length of the interview was sixteen minutes for the gen-
eral public sample and twenty-four minutes for the samples of re-
spondents with committed partners.
Distributive preferences for the scenarios followed easily
identifiable patterns. Accordingly, we present our results in tables
3-6 and 10-13 utilizing these patterns. We also combined the re-
sponses of women and men in same-sex relationships because we
found minimal differences in the two groups' distributive prefer-
ences. For the general public sample, which was drawn randomly,
we provide a margin of error (indicated by a +/-) for the summary
statistics. The margin of error reflects the fact that due to sam-
pling error, an estimate based on a sample of the population can be
higher or lower than the actual number for the population. The
respondents with committed partners were not drawn randomly
and, therefore, a margin of error would not be statistically appro-
priate.
B. Findings
1. Scenarios
This subsection first describes the respondents' distributive
preferences when interviewers presented them with scenarios in
which the decedent was survived by members of the family of ori-
entation (the family in which the decedent was born) and a com-
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mitted partner. 75 The subsection then describes the respondents'
distributive preferences when interviewers presented them with
scenarios in which the decedent was survived by children and a
committed partner. 176 The focus of the discussion for both types of
scenarios was on how large a share of the estate, if any, a surviv-
ing committed partner should receive.
a. Partner and Family of Orientation
Partner and Parents. Under all state intestacy statutes, the
decedent's parents inherit only if the decedent leaves no surviving
descendants. 177 Although in a few states the decedent's parents
and siblings share in the estate, under most states only the par-
ents share with a surviving legal spouse. 178 Under the 1990 UPC,
the spouse receives the first $200,000 plus three-fourths of any
balance of the intestate estate and the parents receive one-fourth
of that part of the intestate estate that exceeds $200,000.179 The
trend in the most recent legislation is to give the surviving spouse
all or nearly all of the decedent's probate estate.180 This trend cor-
responds to the public attitudes found in previous empirical stud-
ies. 8 1 In a telephone survey of the general public published in
175. See infra notes 177-212 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 213-233 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(2) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 107
(Supp. 1997).
178. See, e.g., id. (giving parents of the decedent the remaining portion of the
estate if there are no descendants); Waggoner, supra note 16, at 35 n.39. But see,
e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1(d) (West 1992) (stating that if no spouse sur-
vives, then parents, brothers and sisters take equal shares; if only one parent sur-
vives, that parent takes a double share; if a brother or sister is deceased, then the
surviving descendants of that brother or sister take the deceased sibling's share,
per stirpes).
179. See §§ 2-102(2), -103(2), 8 U.L.A. 106, 107 (Supp. 1997).
180. Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana and North Dakota have followed the
UPC recommendation. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.12.102, .103 (Michie 1996); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-102, -103 (Supp. 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-102, -
103 (Michie 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-112, -113 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
30.1-04-02, -03 (1996). States that have otherwise enacted the 1990 UPC's general
pattern of intestacy-Arizona, Minnesota, New Mexico, South Dakota, and West
Virginia-provide that the surviving spouse inherits the entire estate when the
decedent dies without surviving children but with a surviving parent or parents.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2102 (1995); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-102 (1996); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 2-102 (Michie 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-102 (Michie 1997); W. VA.
CODE § 42-1-3 (1997).
181. See Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the
United States and England, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1303, 1308-09 (1969) (studying the
records of decedent estate administration in Washtenaw County, Michigan, and
finding that nine of 13 wills in the sample provided that the spouse receive the en-
tire estate); Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth
Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 252-53 (1963) (studying probate
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1978 in which married respondents were asked hypothetically to
distribute their estates between their spouses and mothers, over
70% gave their entire estates to their spouses (hereinafter 1978
Inheritance Study).18 2
Several arguments can be made in favor of having parents
share to some extent in the estate with the legal spouse. One is
that childless couples are typically young, suggesting that the
spouse may not have yet emerged as the primary family obligation
and any accumulated wealth may have been derived not as a re-
sult of the joint efforts of the spouses but from the decedent's par-
ents. 183 One source of wealth of a decedent who dies young is a
tort recovery for wrongful conduct leading to the decedent's
death. 184 Allowing the parents to share in the tort recovery would
recognize that the parents bore the cost of rearing the decedent.
Even if the couple is older, it could be argued that in the absence of
children, the couple is less likely to have become financially inter-
dependent except to the extent necessary to provide living ar-
rangements. 8 5 To extend these assumptions to decedents who
have been in long-term committed relationships may be inappro-
priate. Also, for committed couples, the absence of children may
be less indicative of age and of parents having been the source of a
decedent's wealth. 186
To assess public attitudes about distributive patterns be-
tween partners and their parents, the interviewers presented to
respondents Scenario A:
In the first situation, neither the person nor their 187 opposite-
sex partner has any children. We are interested in how you
would divide the estate among the survivors. If, when the
person dies only their own parents and their partner are liv-
ing, what percentage of the estate would you give to their own
proceedings initiated in Cook County, Illinois, in 1953 and 1957 and finding only
six cases where there was a surviving spouse but no children; in all but one of
these cases the testator gave the surviving spouse all of the property).
182. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes about Property Distribu-
tion at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 319, 351 (1978).
183. See id. at 348.
184. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage So-
ciety: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683, 705
n.65 (1992).
185. See Mulder, supra note 57, at 312-13; Waggoner, supra note 184, at 705
n.65.
186. See supra text accompanying note 8 (indicating percentage of opposite-sex
and same-sex couples who have children under the age of fifteen living with them).
187. Although unintentionally grammatically incorrect, the form of the question
avoided identifying the gender of the decedent. This grammatical error was made
in every scenario presented to respondents.
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parents? What percentage would you give to the partner of
the person who dies?
Under prevailing law, the parents would receive the decedent's
entire estate and the partner would receive nothing. 188
The most important finding is that a substantial majority of
the respondents gave some share of the estate to the surviving
partner.18 9 Nearly three-quarters of the respondents from the
general public sample,190 over four-fifths of the respondents with
opposite-sex partners, and all of the respondents with same-sex
partners gave some share of the estate to the surviving partner.' 9'
In the general public sample, a somewhat greater percentage of
the respondents gave half or less of the estate to the partner than
gave half or more. Of the respondents with opposite-sex partners,
over three-quarters gave the surviving partner half or more and
nearly all the respondents with same-sex partners gave the sur-
viving partner half or more. The most prevalent distribution of
the respondents with same-sex partners was to give the partner
the entire estate (64.7%). In contrast, for the other two samples,
the most prevalent distribution was to divide the estate equally be-
tween the partner and the parents (45.3% of the general public
188. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
189. See Table 3 infra p. 41.
190. The margin of error is +/-9.8% (95% confidence interval). This margin of
error reflects the small sample size as well as the tendency of the responses to be
polarized.
191. To assess whether younger people, who are more likely to die intestate,
have different distributive preferences for the scenarios, we divided the samples
into those who were under 40 years old and those who were 40 or older. We com-
pared these groups using both t-tests for mean differences given to a survivor and
using bivariate contingency table analysis. We measured the association of these
variables with gamma (1), and considered y>.3 as indicating a meaningful relation-
ship. Statistical significance is not reported because the two sample groups were
not generated randomly and therefore the results should not be used to make sta-
tistical inferences about populations. Gamma ranges from -1.0 to +1.0 with 0 indi-
cating no relationship.
For respondents with same-sex partners, there were no meaningful differences
by age for the distributive preferences for any scenario. The age distribution in
the sample of respondents with opposite-sex partners did not allow a similar
analysis; very few respondents were 40 or older. For the general public respon-
dents, several differences between the age groups were evident. In Scenario C,
infra p. 47 (decedent survived by own child from a prior relationship and partner),
older respondents gave a greater share of the estate to the partner than did
younger respondents (y=. 44). In Scenario F, see infra p. 74 (decedent survived by
own child from a prior relationship and partner's child from a prior relationship),
older respondents gave the partner's child from a prior relationship a greater
share of the estate than did younger respondents (y=.41). In the modified Scenario
H, see infra p. 79, (decedent survived by couple's child, partner's child from a prior
relationship who never lived in the couple's household, and partner), older respon-
dents gave a smaller share to the couple's child than younger respondents, and
gave a greater share to the partner than did younger respondents (y-.50).
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sample; 42.4% of respondents with opposite-sex partners). 192
When the scenario was repeated describing the decedent and
partner as being of the same sex, the overwhelming majority in
each sample did not change their distributive choices. 193
192. Because we did not randomly draw the sample of respondents with
same-sex partners, we are unable to assess whether the substantial differences in
distributive preferences they show reflect actual differences between persons with
same-sex partners and the other populations or whether the differences presented
here are due to biases in this particular sample. As noted in the methodology sec-
tion, the sample of respondents with same-sex partners differed from the other
samples on several demographic dimensions, including their level of income and
education, their likelihood of not being religious and their likelihood of living in
the St. PaullMinneapolis metropolitan area. See supra note 170 and accompany-
ing text. Although we have no way to determine conclusively whether these fac-
tors account for the differences between samples in distributional preferences,
some evidence exists to support the claim that the differences in distributional
preferences are not due to these demographic factors. In a series of analyses, the
distributional preferences of the general public respondents were compared by
educational level, income level, residence in the St. Paul/Minneapolis metropolitan
area and religiosity. Educational level was categorized by three groups repre-
senting those who had not attended college, those who had some college, and those
who completed college or a higher degree. Distributional preferences were com-
pared using bivariate contingency table analysis. Educational level was not found
to be related to distributional preferences for either Scenario A, see supra p. 37, or
Scenario B, see infra p. 41. More highly educated people, however, were more
likely to give a greater share to the partner's child for Scenarios E, see infra p. 73,
F, see infra p. 74, and G, see infra p. 76 (E: y=.36; F: y--.37; G: y=.34 ). Income,
measured in three groups (0-$20,000; $20,000-$35,000; and over $35,000 per year)
was also unrelated to the distributional preferences for Scenario A. Only for Sce-
nario E was income positively correlated with a preference for giving the partner's
child a greater share (y=. 3 4 ). Similarly, residence in the St. Paul/Minneapolis area
was not associated with the distributional preferences for Scenario A. Only for
Scenario F was residence in the St. Paul/Minneapolis area positively related with a
preference for giving the partner's child a greater share (y-. 4 3 ). Nonreligiousness
was associated with giving the partner a smaller share of the estate in Scenarios
A, B, and C, see supra p. 37 and infra pp. 41, 47 (A: y-.36; B: y=-.43; C: y=-.35) but
not in any of the other scenarios.
193. Of the respondents in the general public, 85.5% (+/-7.8%) indicated no
change in their distributive choices. The same was true for 97.0% of the respon-
dents with opposite-sex partners and 94.7% of the respondents with same-sex
partners. Of those respondents who gave a share of the estate to the surviving
partner, 80.0% (+/-10.4%) of the respondents from the general public sample, 100%
of the respondents with opposite-sex partners, and 94.7% of the respondents with
same-sex partners, did not change their distributive choices when the surviving
partner was of the same sex as the decedent.
These findings may be subject to social desirability bias wherein respondents
answer questions so as to "appear well-adjusted, unprejudiced, rational, [or other-
wise] openminded ...." HERMAN W. SMITH, STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 222
(3d ed. 1991). In Scenario A, see supra p. 37, we repeated the scenario, altering it
only to describe a same-sex couple, and asked the respondents to distribute the
decedent's estate. In the subsequent scenarios, we asked a more simplified form of
the question. For example, in Scenario B, see infra p. 41, in which the decedent
was survived by a partner and siblings, we asked: "Would you give more, less or
the same amount to the partner if the partner was [sic] the same sex as the person
who diesT' Having asked the question about whether sexual orientation of the
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The general public was not supportive of treating committed
partners the same as legal spouses under intestacy statutes. The
share of the estate given to the committed partner by the respon-
dents in the general public sample varied substantially from the
share of the estate given to the legal spouse by respondents in the
1978 Inheritance Study. 194 Respondents with opposite-sex part-
ners (30.3%) were more likely than general public respondents
(14.0%) to treat a partner the same as the married respondents in
the 1978 Inheritance Study treated a legal spouse (70.8%). The
proportion that gave the partner all of the estate was nevertheless
substantially less than the proportion of the married respondents
in the 1978 Inheritance Study that gave the legal spouse the entire
estate. In contrast, the proportion of respondents with same-sex
partners who gave the partner the entire estate (64.7%) is similar
to the proportion of married respondents who gave the legal
spouse the entire estate in the 1978 Inheritance Study (70.8%).195
committed partners mattered in assessing distributive preferences using two dif-
ferent approaches and having yielded comparable results, we have some assurance
that social desirability bias is minimal.
194. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. It is possible that public atti-
tudes toward inheritance rights of surviving legal spouses has changed since the
time of the 1978 Inheritance Study. Legislative trends suggest considerable politi-
cal support for increasing the share passing to the surviving legal spouse. See su-
pra note 180 and accompanying text. Beyond that observation, we have no current
evidence either to support or refute the hypothesis of shifting attitudes about the
amount that a surviving spouse should take under an intestacy statute.
195. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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Table 3. Distribution Patterns for Scenario A: Decedent
Survived by Partner and Parents
General Respondents Respondents
Public with with Same-
Sample Opposite-Sex Sex Partners
Partners
Percent Distribution to:
Partner Parents (%) (%) (%)
100 0 14.0 30.3 64.7
51-99 1-49 8.1 6.1 24.1
50 50 45.3 42.4 10.5
1-49 51-99 4.7 3.0 0.8
0 100 27.9 18.2 0.0
Total N 86 33 133
Partner and Siblings. Under most intestacy statutes, the de-
cedent's siblings do not share in the estate if the decedent is sur-
vived by a legal spouse. 196 A decedent is unlikely to have received
financial support from or given financial support to siblings. A
sibling's claim to a decedent's estate would be based exclusively on
familial ties whether biological or adoptive. To assess public atti-
tudes about the distributive patterns between the surviving part-
ner and the siblings, the interviewers presented respondents with
Scenario B:
Now suppose that when the person dies, only their own
brothers and sisters and their opposite-sex partner are
living. What percentage of the estate would you give to
the brothers and sisters of the person who dies? What
percentage of the estate would you give to the partner of
the person who dies?
Under prevailing law, the siblings would receive the decedent's
entire estate and the partner would receive nothing.197
As was the case when presented with Scenario A,198 a sub-
stantial majority of the respondents gave the surviving partner
some share of the estate in Scenario B.199 Over three-quarters of
196. See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 35.
197. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
198. See supra p. 37.
199. See Table 4 infra p. 43.
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the respondents from the general public sample,200 over four-fifths
of the respondents with opposite-sex partners, and all of the re-
spondents with same-sex partners gave the surviving partner
some share of the estate. Of respondents in the general public
sample, a nearly equal percentage gave half or less of the estate to
the partner as gave half or more. Of the respondents with oppo-
site-sex partners, over three-quarters gave the surviving partner
half or more. Nearly all of the respondents with same-sex partners
gave the surviving partner half or more.
The respondents were slightly more likely to provide a
greater share to the surviving partner in Scenario B than they did
in Scenario A. Although the large majority of respondents in each
sample gave identical distributions for both scenarios (about 70%),
about 20% of the respondents gave more to the partner in Scenario
B than they did in Scenario A.201 Among the respondents from the
general public sample, the primary difference between their re-
sponses to the two scenarios was that a greater proportion of them
preferred that the partner receive the entire estate in Scenario B.
Among the respondents with opposite-sex partners, the primary
difference between their responses to the two scenarios was that a
greater proportion of them preferred that the partner receive over
half, rather than half, of the estate in Scenario B. Although close
to 20% of the respondents with same-sex partners gave more to the
partner in Scenario B, responses did not shift enough to make this
change apparent within the distributive patterns summarized in
Tables 3 and 4. When the respondents were asked if they would
distribute the estate differently if the surviving partner was of the
same sex as the decedent, the overwhelming majority in each
sample indicated that their distributive choices would stay the
same.202
200. The margin of error is +/-9.0%.
201. The remaining 10% of the respondents gave less to the partner when the
decedent was survived by siblings rather than by parents.
202. Of the respondents in the general public sample, 85.4% (+/-7.8%) indicated
no change in their distributive choices. The same was true for 100% of the re-
spondents with opposite-sex partners and 94.8% of the respondents with same-sex
partners. Of those respondents who gave a share of the estate to the surviving
partner, 81.0% (+/-10.0%) of the respondents from the general public sample, 100%
of the respondents with opposite-sex partners, and 94.8% of the respondents with
same-sex partners indicated that they would not change their distributive choices
if the surviving partner were of the same sex as the decedent.
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Table 4. Distribution Patterns for Scenario B: Decedent
Survived by Partner and Siblings
General Respondents Respondents
Public with Oppo- with Same-
Sample site-Sex Sex Partners
Partners
Percent Distribution to:
Partner Siblings (%) (%) (%)
100 0 20.0 30.3 68.7
51-99 1-49 9.4 15.2 23.1
50 50 41.2 33.3 6.7
1-49 51-99 7.1 3.0 1.5
0 100 22.4 18.2 0.0
Total N 85 33 134
The survey findings support the basic approaches found in
both the Waggoner Working Draft and the Hawaii legislation of
treating surviving committed partners as heirs and allowing them
to share in the estates of decedents. Public attitudes expressed by
the respondents in the general public sample are fairly consistent
with the Waggoner Working Draft when the decedent is survived
by a partner and parents. Although a minority of the respondents
preferred that the partner receive over half and another minority
preferred the partner receive less than half, the most prevalent
distribution was to give the partner half of the estate. The ap-
proach of the Waggoner Working Draft to give the surviving com-
mitted partner more than half of the estate when the decedent is
survived by a partner and siblings had little support among re-
spondents from the general public sample. The larger share of the
estate that would go to same-sex committed partners under the
Hawaii legislation under both scenarios received little support in
the general public sample. The respondents in the general public
sample also did not support the exclusion of opposite-sex commit-
ted partners from inheriting under the Hawaii intestacy statute.
Although the scenarios asked respondents to distribute the
property of a third party and not their own property, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that their responses reflect their own distribu-
tive intent. The Waggoner Working Draft reflects the likely intent
1998]
Law and Inequality
of respondents with opposite-sex partners by providing that over
half of the estate passes to the partner when the decedent is sur-
vived by a partner and siblings.203 This group would support modi-
fying the Waggoner Working Draft and increasing the share of the
estate passing to the partner to over half of the estate when the
decedent is survived by a partner and parents.20 4 The Hawaii leg-
islation, which precludes opposite-sex committed partners from
inheriting under its intestacy statute, is inconsistent with the
likely intent expressed by the respondents with opposite-sex part-
ners.
205
The majority of respondents with same-sex partners in both
scenarios prefer that the partner receive the decedent's entire es-
tate and therefore would support modifying the Waggoner Work-
ing Draft to increase the share passing to the surviving partner
under both scenarios. The Hawaii legislation reflects the likely in-
tent of this group when the decedent is survived by a partner and
siblings by giving the partner the entire estate. 206 It fails to reflect
this group's likely intent, however, when the decedent is survived
by a partner and parents by giving the partner over half of the es-
tate but not all of it.207
Further evidence of the likely intent of the respondents in
this group regarding the competing inheritance claims of a com-
mitted partner and parents is found in their reporting of their cur-
rent estate plans. Over 58% of respondents who had parents sur-
viving but no children and who had wills or life insurance
designated their partners as their sole beneficiary in their wills or
life insurance policies. Too few respondents with wills or life in-
surance had siblings but no parents or children to draw any con-
clusions based on the reporting of their current estate plans.
20°
203. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text; Table 1, supra p. 26
204. See supro notes 121-122 and accompanying text; Table 1, supra p. 26.
205. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
206. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-102(1)(A) (Michie Supp. 1997).
207. See id. § 560:2-102(2).
208. There were too few respondents with opposite-sex partners who had wills
or life insurance to draw any conclusions based on their current estate plans.
A substantial number of the respondents with same-sex partners named their
partners as beneficiaries in their wills and life insurance policies, even if they did
not name their partner sole beneficiary. After respondents were asked if they had
a will or life insurance, they were asked who was named as a beneficiary. A list of
potential takers that included partner and parents was read. Over 90% of the re-
spondents with same-sex partners who had parents surviving but no children and
who had wills or life insurance designated their partner as a beneficiary but not
necessarily the sole beneficiary. Data were not collected on the proportion of the
estate or proceeds that the partner would receive under the respondent's estate
plan.
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The distributive preferences expressed by the two sample
groups with committed partners reveal considerable differences
between persons with opposite-sex committed partners and per-
sons with same-sex committed partners. The differences are likely
due in part to the different methods used to generate the two sam-
ples.209 Some of the differences may also be explained by the fact
that legal marriage is an option for opposite-sex couples. 210 Oppo-
site-sex couples who may have similar preferences to same-sex
couples may be excluded from the comparison because they have
married. Furthermore, for those who are unmarried, the nature of
the commitment is influenced by the opportunity to gain legal rec-
ognition through marriage. Another possible explanation for the
differences is that respondents with same-sex partners may be
more concerned that partners not be treated unfavorably as com-
pared to legal spouses. 21 1 The findings of our study are inadequate
to assess which if any of these explanations has merit. Further re-
search is necessary to assess whether these or other factors are in-
fluencing the two groups' distributive preferences. Based on the
differences in distributive preferences expressed by the two groups
in this study, it might be argued that donative intent would be fur-
thered if the intestacy share passing to a same-sex committed
partner were greater than the share passing to an opposite-sex
partner. There was strong agreement among respondents in all
three samples, however, that opposite-sex and same-sex partners
should be treated the same for purposes of intestacy. 212
b. Partner and Children
When a surviving legal spouse is also the biological or adop-
tive parent of the decedent's children, there is current widespread
209. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing methods used to
generate the sample of same-sex and opposite-sex committed couples).
210. But see Ronald R. Rindfuss & Audrey VandenHeuvel, Cohabitation: A Pre-
cursor to Marriage or an Alternative to Being Single?, 16 POPULATION & DEV. REV.
703, 704-07 (1990). Rindfuss and Vandenfeuvel question the assumption in much
of the literature that cohabitation is either an alternative form of marriage or the
final state in a relationship that leads to marriage. See id. They posit that cohabi-
tation by opposite-sex couples might be better understood if it were associated with
singlehood rather than marriage. See id. at 705. They present data supporting
the proposition that attributes of those cohabiting are more similar to persons who
are single than persons who are married. See id. The authors, however, recognize
a substantial diversity among opposite-sex cohabiting couples and agree that for
those who have cohabited a substantial amount of time, understanding the rela-
tionship as an alternative to marriage may be accurate. See id. at 704.
211. See supra text accompanying note 39 (recognizing that equal treatment of
same-sex couples and married couples has the potential of disrupting systemic
subordination based on sexuality).
212. See supra notes 193, 202 and accompanying text.
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consensus that the spouse should take the entire estate to the ex-
clusion of the children.213 If the children are minors at the time of
the decedent's death, then it is assumed that surviving spouses are
in a better position to use the inherited property for the benefit of
their children as well as for themselves. 214 If the children are
adults at the time of the decedent's death, the assumption is made
that the spouses are more likely to have greater economic needs
than their children and that any unconsumed portions of the es-
tates will pass to the children when the surviving spouses die.215
The distributive pattern of giving the entire estate to the surviving
spouse when the decedent and spouse have joint children and nei-
ther the decedent nor the spouse have any children from prior re-
lationships is supported by a number of empirical studies. 216
If the decedent dies survived by children from a prior rela-
tionship and the legal spouse of a current marriage, the appropri-
ate distribution of the estate between spouse and children is less
certain. 217 As legislatures have enacted statutes that provide the
entire or a substantial share (over half) of the estate to a surviving
spouse, they also have enacted provisions that reduce that share if
the decedent dies also survived by children from a prior relation-
ship.218 The concern arises that surviving spouses will not be gen-
erous in providing financial support for their stepchildren if they
are minors and will not pass any unconsumed portions of the es-
tates to their stepchildren at their deaths.2 19 Legislatures also
have enacted provisions that reduce the share passing to the sur-
viving spouse if the spouse has children from a prior relation-
ship.220 The concern is that the surviving spouse will share at
least some of the decedent's property with the decedent's stepchil-
dren at the expense of the decedent's children.221
213. See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 36-38.
214. See id. at 37.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 36-37 nn.42-43.
217. See id. at 38-41.
218. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(4) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 106
(Supp. 1997).
219. See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 38.
220. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(3) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 106
(Supp. 1997).
221. See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 38. The possibility exists that the same
conflicts will arise after the decedent's death if the surviving spouse has more chil-
dren. To take that possibility into account when designing an intestacy law would
mean that the surviving spouse should usually receive a limited share. That re-
sult does not seem to correspond with public attitudes that favor surviving spouses
receiving the entire estate. See id. at 38 n.45.
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With these intestate succession patterns regarding blended
families in mind, we sought to assess public attitudes about dis-
tributive patterns to partners when the family units involved chil-
dren who were not the children of both partners. Immediately be-
low we present findings from scenarios that involved decedents
survived by children from a prior relationship and a partner. In
Part III, we further consider distributive patterns to surviving
partners by assessing public attitudes about treating a partner's
child as an heir of the decedent. 222 The interviewers presented the
respondents with Scenario C:
[Tihe person has a child under 18 from a prior relationship
and the opposite-sex partner has no children. When the per-
son dies, how would you divide the estate between the per-
son's child and their partner? What percentage of the estate
would you give to the child of the person who dies? What per-
centage of the estate would you give to the partner of the per-
son who dies?
Under prevailing law, the decedent's child would receive the entire
estate and the committed partner would receive nothing.223
A minor child was chosen as the competing claimant to the
partner because we hypothesized this would be one of the likely
situations where the respondents might believe that decedents had
an obligation to provide a substantial amount of their estates to
their children. Respondents had a variety of distributive prefer-
ences for this scenario. The majority of respondents in each sam-
ple (62.8% of the general public sample;224 69.7% of the respon-
dents with opposite-sex partners; 93.9% of the respondents with
same-sex partners) gave the surviving partner some share of the
estate. 225 Nearly 56% of the general public sample gave the sur-
viving partner a share that was half or less of the estate but more
than zero. Of the respondents with opposite-sex partners, this
pattern prevailed two-thirds of the time. Of the respondents with
same-sex partners, the majority divided the estate evenly between
the partner and the decedent's child (57.3%); 22.1% gave the part-
ner over half of the estate; and 20.6% gave the partner under half.
Although a significant proportion of the respondents from the gen-
eral public sample (37.2%) and of the respondents with opposite-
sex partners (30.3%) preferred that the child inherit the entire es-
tate, the most predominant distribution among those respondents
222. See infra Part III.B. 1 (discussing the results of the surveys regarding chil-
dren of committed partners).
223. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
224. The margin of error is +/-10.4%.
225. See Table 5 infra p. 49.
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who gave the partner some share was to share the estate equally
between the partner and the child. 226 Among committed partners,
both opposite-sex and same-sex, with children, 90% would give the
partner some share of the estate, but only 12% would give the
partner over half of the estate. A majority of this group (58%)
would share the decedent's estate equally between the partner and
the child. When the respondents were asked if they would distrib-
ute the estate differently if the surviving partner were of the same
sex as the decedent, the overwhelming majority in each sample in-
dicated that their distributive choices would stay the same.
2 27
226. Although the data support an intestacy law that gives a committed partner
a share of the estate, it also reveals, once again, that public attitudes toward a
surviving committed partner are different from public attitudes toward a surviving
legal spouse. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. In the 1978 Inheritance
Study, see supra note 182 and accompanying text, respondents were asked how
they would share their estate between a spouse and a minor child from a prior re-
lationship who was living with the former spouse. Fellows et al., supra note 182, at
366. A substantial majority (89.1%) of the respondents gave the surviving spouse
half or more. Id. In the 1978 Inheritance Study the child from a prior marriage
lived with the former spouse. Id. It is uncertain whether respondents assumed
some level of estrangement between the child and the decedent.
227. Of the respondents in the general public, 85.7% (+/-7.6%) indicated no
change in their distributive choices. The same was true for 97.0% of the respon-
dents with opposite-sex partners and 98.5% of the respondents with same-sex
partners. Of those respondents who gave a share of the estate to the surviving
partner, 81.1% (+/-10.8%) of the general public, 95.7% of respondents with oppo-
site-sex partners, and 99.2% of respondents with same-sex partners, indicated that
they would not change their distributive choices if the surviving partner were of
the same sex as the decedent.
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Table 5. Distribution Patterns for Scenario C: Decedent
Survived by Own Child from a Prior Relationship and
Partner
General Respondents Respondents
Public with with Same-
Sample Opposite-Sex Sex Partners
Partners
Percent Distribution to:
Partner Person's
Child (%) (%) (%)
100 0 4.7 0.0 12.2
51-99 1-49 2.3 3.0 9.9
50 50 38.4 42.4 57.3
1-49 51-99 17.4 24.2 14.5
0 100 37.2 30.3 6.1
Total N 86 33 131
The data obtained when interviewers presented the respon-
dents with Scenario D provide further support for giving a commit-
ted partner a share of the estate:
In [this] situation, a retired widow and retired widower enter
into a committed relationship and live together without get-
ting married. They both have children from their prior mar-
riages. If the widower dies first, what percentage of the es-
tate, if any, would you give to his partner? If the widow dies
first, what percentage of the estate, if any, would you give to
her partner?
Under prevailing law, the decedent's children would receive the
entire estate. 228
This scenario was chosen because we hypothesized that this
would be one of the most likely situations where respondents
might feel that decedents had no obligation to share their estates
with their committed partners. By identifying both partners as re-
tired, respondents could be expected to infer that any accumula-
tion of wealth occurred before each partner entered into the rela-
tionship. Because both partners had children from prior
relationships, respondents could be expected to conclude that dis-
inheritance of both partners would be fair because each would be
228. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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assured that her or his children would receive her or his estate.
Notwithstanding all of the reasons why the respondents might
conclude it would be appropriate to disinherit the committed part-
ner in Scenario D, only a minority of the respondents in each sam-
ple came to that conclusion (28.9% of the general public sample; 229
24.2% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners; 7.0% of the
respondents with same-sex partners).23 0 The respondents made
virtually no distinction between the circumstances when the
widow died first and the widower died first. Of the respondents in
the general sample, slightly over 87% of them gave the surviving
partner a share that was half or less of the estate. 231 Of the re-
spondents with opposite-sex partners, this pattern prevailed 72.7%
of the time. Of the respondents with same-sex partners, about
40% divided the estate evenly between the partner and the dece-
dent's children; nearly one-third gave the partner over half of the
estate; and over one-quarter gave the partner under half of the es-
tate. The most predominant distribution among those respondents
who gave the partner some share was to share the estate equally
between the partner and the children (57.6% of the general public
sample; 52.0% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners;
45.0% of the respondents with same-sex partners).
229. The margin of error is +/- 10.0%.
230. See Table 6 infra p. 51.
231. The margin of error is +/-7.4%.
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Table 6. Distribution Patterns for Scenario D: Widow or
Widower Survived by Partner and Children from Prior
Relationship
General Public Respondents with Respondents with
Sample Opposite-Sex Same-Sex Partners
Partners
Percent
Distribution
to:
Widower Widow Widower Widow Widower Widow
died first died first died first died first died first died first
Partner (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
100 10.8 11.1 21.2 21.2 26.4 26.4
51-99 2.4 2.4 9.1 9.1 6.2 6.2
50 41.0 39.0 39.4 39.4 41.9 40.3
1-49 16.9 17.1 9.1 9.1 18.6 20.2
0 28.9 30.5 24.2 24.2 7.0 7.0
Total N 83 82 33 33 129 129
The survey findings again support the basic approaches of
the Waggoner Working Draft and the Hawaii legislation of treat-
ing surviving committed partners as heirs and allowing them to
share in the estates of decedents. Given the regard for children in
inheritance law generally, the findings supporting having children
share their parent's estate with their parent's committed partner
are significant. The Waggoner Working Draft provides that the
surviving committed partner receive half of the intestate estate in
Scenarios C and D and that the decedent's child(ren) receive the
other half.232 In both scenarios, at least a plurality of respondents
in each of the three samples supports this distributional pattern,
although a significant percentage of general public respondents
and respondents with opposite-sex partners prefer to have the
child(ren) inherit the decedent's entire estate.
For same-sex couples, the Hawaii legislation provides that
the surviving committed partner receive $100,000 plus half of any
balance of the intestate estate and that the decedent's child(ren)
232. See Appendix, § (a)(2), infra p. 92; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (amended
1993), 8 U.L.A. 107-08 (Supp. 1997).
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receive the other half of the balance of the estate.233 The findings
do not support the Hawaii legislation's approach of not permitting
an opposite-sex committed partner to inherit. The findings also do
not support the distributional pattern of giving a surviving com-
mitted partner more than half of a decedent's estate.
2. Defining Committed Partners
If an intestacy statute includes committed partners as poten-
tial heirs, the statute must provide a definition of who qualifies as
a committed partner. 234 In this study, we drew the samples based
233. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-102(4) (Michie Supp. 1996). The Hawaii leg-
islation does not apply to opposite-sex committed couples and therefore a dece-
dent's opposite-sex committed partner would receive nothing. See supra notes 148-
50 and accompanying text. Consequently, under the Hawaii legislation, for Sce-
narios C, see supra p. 47, and D, see supra p. 49, contrary to the results in this
study, the surviving committed partner would receive nothing.
234. The courts and legislative and regulatory bodies have addressed the ques-
tion of how to define a committed partner. In Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 543
N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989), the court held that a surviving committed partner qualified
under a rent-control statute as a member of "the deceased tenant's family." Id. at
49. In the course of its reasoning, the court suggested the following objective stan-
dards to determine whether a family relationship existed, warranting statutory
protection under the rent and eviction statute and accompanying regulations:
In making this assessment, the lower courts of this State have looked to a
number of factors, including the exclusivity and longevity of the relation-
ship, the level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in
which the parties have conducted their everyday lives and held them-
selves out to society, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily
family services. These factors are most helpful, although it should be em-
phasized that the presence or absence of one or more of them is not dis-
positive since it is the totality of the relationship as evidenced by the dedi-
cation, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties which should, in the final
analysis, control.
Id. at 55. Soon after the Braschi decision, regulations were issued enlarging the
definition of family member. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2500.2[n]
(1990). The listed factors in the regulation included the sharing of household ex-
penses, the intermingling of finances, participating in family-type activities, for-
malizing legal obligations toward each other, holding themselves out as family
members, performing family functions and other patterns of behavior demon-
strating an intention to create a long-term relationship. See id. For qualified
family members, noneviction protection generally is available only if the family
member lived in the apartment for two years. See id.
In Butch v. Forte, the court explicitly referred to marriage as the standard by
which to evaluate a relationship:
Evidence of the stability and significance of the relationship could be
demonstrated by the duration of the relationship; whether the parties
have a mutual contract; the degree of economic cooperation and entan-
glement; exclusivity of sexual relations; whether there is a "family" rela-
tionship with children. While the particular items of evidence will vary
from case to case, and some of these suggested criteria may be absent, and
other different ones present, the plaintiff will bear the burden of demon-
strating both that the relationship is stable and that it has those charac-
teristics of significance which one may expect to find in what is essentially
[Vol. 16:1
COMMITTED PARTNERS
on a self-definition of committed relationship. For the purpose of
developing a statutory definition of committed partner, we gath-
ered information about the respondents' committed relationships
to assess whether common observable attributes could be used to
identify committed partners. We sought respondents' own mean-
ing of commitment by asking: "What is it about your relationship
that makes you define it as committed?" To elicit further re-
sponses, we asked respondents: "Is there anything else you would
say?" Respondents' answers were coded according to the eleven
preset responses listed in Table 7.235 Responses not fitting easily
into these preset categories were taken verbatim and placed into
the "other" category. Because this approach predictably would
elicit spontaneous responses highly salient to the respondents but
not necessarily indicating observable attributes, we created an-
other set of questions asking respondents whether an observable
attribute applied to their relationships. 2 6 The purpose of these
questions was to assess the frequency with which certain attrib-
utes, which could be incorporated easily into a statute, occur
among self-defined committed partners. 23 7
As Table 7238 shows, a considerable number of both respon-
dents with same-sex and with opposite-sex partners responded to
the open-ended question by indicating a general sense of their
feelings of commitment to their partners. Respondents with same-
sex partners also often responded by expressing their deep love for
their partners. Respondents with same-sex partners also often in-
dicated they had stated their commitment to each other publicly or
had participated in a commitment ceremony. Additionally, several
responses coded as "other" in the table contained similar ideas in-
dicating public or family acknowledgment of their relationships.
Over one-third of the respondents in each group indicated that
living together demonstrated their commitment to their partners.
Nearly half of the respondents with same-sex partners and ap-
proximately one-quarter of the respondents with opposite-sex
partners identified monogamy over an extended period of time as a
defining characteristic of their committed relationships. Several
a de facto marriage.
188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 512 (Ct. App. 1983); see also Rebecca L. Melton, Legal Rights of
Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of
Family, 29 J. FAMILY L. 497, 503-06 (1991) (identifying varying requirements for
registration in municipalities).
235. See Table 7 infra p. 54.
236. See Table 8 infra p. 55.
237. These results are presented in Table 8. See Table 8 infra p. 55.
238. See Table 7 infra p. 54.
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responses coded as "other" in Table 7 contained mention of the
length of the relationship itself or of monogamy without reference
to time. About one-third of the respondents with same-sex part-
ners and a similar proportion of the respondents with opposite-sex
partners referred to their financial interdependence with their
partners. Another common response among respondents with
same-sex partners was the indication that the couple planned their
present and/or future together. Less common among both groups
were respondents who referred to having had a child together,
having executed mutual wills, or having obtained mutual life in-
surance policies as characteristics that led them to define their
relationships as committed. In several responses coded as "other"
in Table 7, respondents explicitly compared their commitment to
their partners to that of married spouses.
Table 7. Open-ended responses to "What is it about your
relationship that makes you define it as committed?"
(Percent giving the response)
Respondents Respondents
with Opposite- with Same-Sex
Sex Partners Partners
Feel committed 33.3 44.0
Deeply in love 3.3 24.8
Stated commitment
publicly/commitment ceremony 0.0 21.1
Living together 36.7 35.3
Monogamy over an "extended"
period of time 26.7 45.1
Financial interdependence 30.0 37.6
Plan present lives together 3.3 29.3
Plan future lives together 6.7 33.1
Have or rear children together 6.7 11.3
Have mutual wills 0.0 4.5
Have mutual life insurance policies 6.7 6.8
Other 26.7 21.5
Total N 30 135
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As Table 8 shows, the list of observable attributes capture many
of the themes suggested in the respondents' open-ended responses. 239
Table 8. Distribution of Observable Attributes of
Committed Relationships among Committed
Partners (Percent responding "yes")
Respondents Respondents
with Opposite- with Same-Sex
Sex Partners Partners
Commitment Ceremony 6.7 26.7
Exchange a symbol (ring or other
jewelry) 30.0 64.4
Arranged to be buried next to each
other 6.7 5.9
Registration of partner with a
municipality 0.0 21.5
-where possible 0.0 36.3
Joint charitable gifts 43.3 76.3
Joint bank accounts 36.7 71.1
Joint investment 6.7 37.8
Joint ownership of car or motor
vehicle 20.0 42.2
Joint ownership of home 20.0 63.0
-of home owners 35.3 73.3
Joint credit cards 20.0 46.7
Joint ownership of pet 43.3 74.1
Joint debt (other than home) 13.3 20.0
-of those who have debt 28.6 37.0
Having reared or actively rearing
child together 23.3 14.8
Partner is health care
decisionmaker 26.7 71.1
Partner is a beneficiary of life
insurance 33.3 69.6
-of those with life insurance 43.5 88.7
Total N 30 135
239. See Table 8 infra p. 55.
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Observable symbols of partners' feelings of commitment in-
clude the couple having participated in a commitment ceremony;
registered their relationship with a municipality; made joint gifts
to charity; exchanged a symbol of the relationship, such as a ring
or other jewelry; and made arrangements to be buried next to each
other.240 Over 90% of the respondents with same-sex partners and
48.5% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners indicated
having done at least one of these symbolic acts. Although several
of the symbols of commitment (namely, a commitment ceremony,
burial arrangements and registration of relationship with a mu-
nicipality) were not commonly found within the surveyed groups,
their proof might carry significant evidentiary weight because they
are associated closely with the intention of making a life-long
commitment.
Each of the symbols identified as an attribute has a public
aspect to it, suggesting its usefulness in developing statutory crite-
ria for defining a committed relationship. The public aspect, how-
ever, should caution us in using this type of symbol as a prerequi-
site to a finding of a committed relationship for purposes of
inheritance. To do so would ignore the continuing discrimination
perpetrated against those in the LGBT communities that makes it
risky and sometimes dangerous to reveal sexual orientation. Re-
ligious and social considerations may also inhibit opposite-sex cou-
ples from publicly declaring their relationships as committed. By
making a public symbol a prerequisite to obtaining statutory rec-
ognition of a committed relationship, only those persons who are
willing or able to declare their relationships publicly would be eli-
gible to have their partners share in their estates.
The theme of current and future planning dynamics between
the partners is captured by the observable attributes of the couple
owning a pet together, having a child together, sharing parental
responsibilities for a child of either partner or naming the partner
as health care decisionmaker. 241 Over 90% of the respondents with
same-sex partners and over 57% of the respondents with opposite-
sex partners indicated current and future planning together in at
least one of these ways. Like the symbolic indicators, these pro-
vide evidence about the emotional and affective commitment the
partners have for each other and the level of trust they place in
each other.
240. See Table 8 supra p. 55.
241. See Table 8 supra p. 55.
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The theme of financial interdependence, which also reflects
current and future planning dynamics between the partners, is
captured by the observable attributes of the couple making joint
charitable gifts, having joint bank accounts or investments, having
joint ownership of a car or home or having joint credit cards or
other joint debt.242 Nearly 95% of the respondents with same-sex
partners and over 57% of the respondents with opposite-sex part-
ners indicated financial interdependence in at least one of these
ways. This evidence is particularly pertinent to inheritance law
because it indicates a willingness to share property. Many of these
financial arrangements suggest that partners trust each other to
make financial decisions that will reflect the economic interests
and values of both partners.
Although the criteria of financial interdependence may not be
appropriate for defining a committed relationship for other pur-
poses, it is useful under an intestacy statute that is designed to re-
flect the likely donative intent of the decedent. Notwithstanding
the apparent meaningfulness of indicators of financial interde-
pendence to assist in identifying committed relationships, it risks
incorporating the traditional marital model for property ownership
and financial control into the definition of nonmarital relation-
ships.243
A counterargument for including indicators of financial in-
terdependence in the definition, however, is the high incidence of
one or more of these indicators in the relationships of the respon-
dents participating in the study. In any case, because some of
these indicators of financial interdependence have a public aspect
and because they generally are available only to those persons
with economic means, they should not be used as a prerequisite for
finding a committed relationship. Evidence of financial interde-
pendence should be available to demonstrate a committed rela-
tionship, but lack of such evidence should not be admissible to
demonstrate an absence of commitment.
Two other indicators that are particularly germane to a defi-
nition of a committed partner for purposes of an inheritance stat-
ute are naming the partner as a beneficiary of a life insurance
242. See Table 8 supra p. 55.
243. See supra pp. 109-10. But see generally Marjorie Kornhauser, Love, Money,
and the IRS: Family, Income.Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 63, 80-91 (1993) (showing the following based on empirical studies:
not all couples pool their assets, pooling is not confined to married couples, finan-
cial arrangements change during the course of a relationship and couples are
likely to overstate the extent of financial sharing).
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policy and making arrangements to be buried next to each other.244
Both indicators reflect the couple's consideration of each other
when planning for their deaths. At least one of these arrange-
ments had been made by 69.9% of the respondents with same-sex
partners and 36.4% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners.
The naming of the partner as a beneficiary of life insurance has
further relevance to an inheritance statute because it reflects one
partner's intent to provide for the other partner at death. Other
arrangements that reflect a partner's intent to provide for the
other partner at death include the joint ownership of homes, cars,
investments and bank accounts. Over 92% of the respondents with
same-sex partners and over 51% of the respondents with opposite-
sex partners indicated having named their partners as life insur-
ance beneficiaries or made at least one of these other arrange-
ments. Although the presence of these deathtime financial ar-
rangements may not be an appropriate criteria for defining a
committed relationship for other purposes, it is under an intestacy
statute that is designed to reflect the likely donative intent of the
decedent. 245
The duration of the relationship is one indicator that re-
flects emotional and affective commitment. Table 9 indicates the
distribution of respondents based on the length of time the re-
spondents had been in the relationship and the length of time they
had been cohabiting. 246 Respondents with opposite-sex partners
had been in their relationships and had lived together for a shorter
duration than respondents with same-sex partners. For the re-
spondents with same-sex partners, the mean duration of their
committed relationships was 8.5 years and the mean duration of
cohabiting was 7.5 years. For the respondents with opposite-sex
partners, the mean duration of their committed relationships was
5.5 years and the mean duration of cohabiting was 3.9 years.
244. See Table 8 supra p. 55.
245. The deathtime financial arrangements discussed in the text are frequently
referred to as "will substitutes," "nonprobate transfers" or "nontestamentary trans-
fers." See WAGGONER ET AL. supra note 58, at 403-04. This is to distinguish them
from property owned by the decedent that passes through probate and is governed
by a will or, in the absence of a will, by an intestacy statute. See id. at 15. None of
the property subject to nontestamentary transfers is part of a decedent's probate
estate, and therefore none of this property is subject to the intestacy law that is
the focus of this study. See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolu-
tion and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984)
(describing the various types of will substitutes, their increasing importance and
the causes for their growing popularity).
246. See Table 9 infra p. 5 9 .
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Table 9. Duration of Committed Relationships and
Cohabitation
Respondents with Opposite-
Sex Partners
Respondents with Same-Sex
Partners
Duration of Duration of Duration of Duration of
Relationship Cohabitation Relationship Cohabitation
(of those co- (of those co-
habiting habiting)
(%) (%) (%) (%)
0-4 years 60.6 54.5 25.2 36.2
5-9 years 21.2 41.0 38.5 33.9
10+ years 18.2 4.5 36.3 29.9
Total N 33 22 135 127
The link between duration and life-long commitment and
emotional and affective commitment may be appropriate for some
same-sex and opposite-sex committed couples. In the absence of a
legally recognized date when a relationship is regarded as coming
into existence, looking to duration may seem to be a reasonable
statutory substitute. We should remain wary, however, of too
great a focus on duration. A lifetime relationship as it is under-
stood within the marriage model may not have the same meaning
or importance for many same-sex couples and even for some oppo-
site-sex couples. 247
Within the context of intestacy law, for which donative intent
is a central issue, we analyzed the data to assess whether any of
these various observable indicators were associated with a prefer-
ence for having a committed partner inherit. We compared a re-
spondent's distributive preferences under the scenarios with the
observable attributes that were applicable to the respondent's
committed relationship. As we argued earlier, although the sce-
narios asked respondents to distribute the property of a third
party and not their own property, it seems reasonable to assume
that their responses reflected their preferences for distribution of
their own property. 248
247. See ELIZABETH LAPOVSKY KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF
LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY 280 (1993)
(suggesting time is a subjective and relative phenomenon within lesbian relation-
ships).
248. See supra p. 43.
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The relationships between the respondents' distributive pref-
erences and the presence of each indicator were examined using
bivariate contingency table analysis. For analysis, distributive
preferences were collapsed into categories representing the domi-
nant patterns of each sample group. We performed this analysis
with respect to Scenario A, 249 in which the decedent died survived
by a partner and parents, and Scenario C,250 in which the decedent
died survived by a partner and decedent's child from a prior rela-
tionship.
For the respondents with same-sex partners, the three cate-
gories reflecting the dominant preferential patterns in Scenario A
included: giving half or less of the estate to the partner, giving
over half of the estate to the partner and giving the entire estate to
the partner.25 1 For this group, the following indicators were each
positively associated with a preference for having the partner re-
ceive a larger share of the decedent's estate than if that indicator
did not apply to the respondent's relationship: exchanging a sym-
bol of the relationship, such as a ring or other jewelry; registering
the relationship with a municipality; sharing ownership of a car;
sharing ownership of a pet; shared debt; naming a partner as a
beneficiary of life insurance; and naming a partner as health care
decisionmaker. 252
Similarly, having been in the relationship for at least five
years was positively associated with a preference for having the
partner receive a greater share of the decedent's estate. Other-
wise, the length of time spent living together had only a weak rela-
tionship to the distributive preferences. There were too few cases
of respondents making arrangements to be buried next to each
other to consider its relationship to the distributive preferences.
The remaining indicators either showed weak or no relationship to
the distributive preferences of the respondents.
For the respondents with opposite-sex partners, the three
categories reflecting the dominant distributive patterns in Sce-
nario A included: giving less than half of the estate to the partner,
giving half of the estate to the partner and giving over half of the
249. See Scenario A supra p. 37.
250. See Scenario C supra p. 47.
251. See Table 3 supra p. 41.
252. Each indicator has the following gamma: exchanged symbol of relationship
(y=.3 4 ); registered committed relationship (y-.31); shared ownership of a motor
vehicle (y-. 5 3 ); shared ownership of a pet (y-.35); shared debt (y-. 4 8 ); named part-
ner a beneficiary of life insurance (y=.38); named partner health care decision-
maker (y=.3 1); length of relationship (y. 3 1). See supra note 191 (discussing use of
gamma).
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estate to the partner.253 For this group, the results indicate sev-
eral strong relationships between the observable indicators and
distributive preferences. 254 The following indicators were each
positively associated with a preference for having the partner re-
ceive a larger share of the decedent's estate than if that indicator
did not apply to the respondent's relationship: exchanging a sym-
bol of the relationship, such as a ring or other jewelry; making
joint charitable gifts; owning a joint bank account; naming a part-
ner as beneficiary of life insurance; and naming a partner as
health care decisionmaker. Sharing ownership of a pet was also
moderately associated with a preference for having the partner re-
ceive a greater share of the decedent's estate. Both having been in
the relationship for at least five years and having cohabited for at
least five years were each strongly related to a preference for
having the partner receive a greater share of the decedent's estate.
Because there were too few cases to consider several of these indi-
cators alone in the sample of respondents with opposite-sex part-
ners, additional analysis was conducted based on the common
themes described above. Having at least one of the symbolic indi-
cators was highly associated with a preference for having the
partner receive a greater share of the decedent's estate. The same
was true for having at least one of the indicators representing pre-
sent and future planning and for having at least one of the indica-
tors representing financial interdependence. Having at least one
of the deathtime arrangements was highly associated with a pref-
erence for having the partner receive a greater share of the estate,
as was having at least one of the indicators pertaining to life in-
surance and joint ownership.
For Scenario C, distributive preferences were again divided
into three categories to represent the dominant patterns of each
group. For the respondents with same-sex partners, the three
categories included: giving less than half of the estate to the part-
ner, giving half of the estate to the partner and giving over half of
the estate to the partner.255 The results indicate that naming a
partner as health care decisionmaker or sharing debt were posi-
tively associated with a preference for having the partner inherit a
253. See Table 3 supra p. 41.
254. Each indicator has the following gamma: exchanged symbol of the rela-
tionship (y=.85); made joint charitable gifts (y-.61); owned joint bank accounts
(y=.5 7 ); named partner beneficiary of life insurance (y-. 6 3 ); named partner health
care decisionmaker (y-. 6 2 ); shared ownership of a pet (y=.3 3 ); length of relation-
ship (y-.52); length of cohabitation (y-. 6 9 ); symbolic indicators (Y-. 7 9 ); life plan-
ning indicators (y=.55); financial interdependence indicators (y=.66); deathtime
planning indicators (y=.70); life insurance and joint ownership indicators (y-.68).
255. See Table 5 supra p. 49.
1998]
Law and Inequality
greater share of the decedent's estate than if either of these indica-
tors did not apply to the respondent's relationship. Both the dura-
tion of the relationship and the time spent cohabiting were posi-
tively associated with a preference for having the partner inherit a
greater share of the estate. The symbolic indicators, which were
associated with distributive preferences for Scenario A, were asso-
ciated only weakly with the distributive preferences for Scenario
C. The remaining observable indicators demonstrated weak or no
relationship to the distributive preferences for Scenario C.256
For the respondents with opposite-sex partners, the three
categories included: giving none of the estate to the partner, giv-
ing less than half of the estate to the partner and giving half or
more of the estate to the partner. 257 The following indicators were
each positively associated with a preference for having the partner
receive a larger share of the decedent's estate than if that indicator
did not apply to the respondent's relationship: exchanging a sym-
bol of the relationship, such as a ring or other jewelry; acquiring
joint credit cards; owning joint bank accounts; and naming the
partner as health care decisionmaker. 258 The length of the rela-
tionship showed no association to the distributive preferences of
the respondents, but time spent cohabiting was positively associ-
ated with a preference for having the partner inherit a greater
share of the estate. Again, because there were too few cases in this
sample group to consider several of the indicators alone, additional
analysis was conducted based on the themes described above.
Having at least one of the symbolic indicators was positively asso-
ciated with a preference for having the partner inherit a greater
share of the estate. Similarly, having at least one of the indicators
of financial interdependence was positively associated with a pref-
erence for having the partner inherit a greater share of the estate.
Finally, having at least one of the indicators pertaining to life in-
surance or joint ownership was positively associated with a prefer-
ence for having the partner inherit a greater share of the estate.
The overall pattern of findings indicates considerable differ-
ences between the respondents with same-sex committed partners
256. Each indicator has the following gamma: named partner as health care
decisionmaker (y=.31); shared debt (y-.31); length of relationship (y-.44); length of
cohabitation (y-.38).
257. See Table 5 supra p. 49.
258. Each indicator has the following gamma: exchanged a symbol of the rela-
tionship (y=. 6 3); acquired joint credit cards (y-.42); owned joint bank accounts
(y-. 5 7); named partner as health care decisionmaker (y-. 4 7); length of cohabitation
(y-. 3 7); symbolic indicators (y-.3 1); financial interdependence indicators (y=.37);
life insurance and joint ownership indicators (y-.30).
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and the respondents with opposite-sex partners. The disparities
pertain both to the prevalence of the relationship indicators ex-
amined and the capacity of the indicators to predict the respon-
dents' distributive preferences regarding the committed partner.
As we indicated earlier regarding differences in distributive pref-
erences, we can only speculate on possible explanations for the dif-
ferences. 259 The dissimilarities that were revealed regarding indi-
cators of a committed relationship raise questions about how we
should use the indicators for identifying a committed relationship.
They also bolster the need for further research to assess whether
same-sex committed relationships can or should be treated the
same as opposite-sex committed relationships under an intestacy
statute.
Apart from the question of whether committed relationships
should be defined the same for same-sex and opposite-sex couples,
the findings support the approach adopted in the Waggoner
Working Draft for defining a committed relationship. 260 Observ-
able factors closely correspond to self-definitions of a committed
relationship and can be associated with a preference for having a
committed partner inherit. A comparison of the factors found in
the Waggoner Working Draft and those generated from this study
show a substantial correspondence. Most notably, the findings
support the Draft's use of shared debt and shared ownership of as-
sets as well as the naming of a partner as a beneficiary of life in-
surance or as health care decisionmaker as factors to be considered
in finding a committed relationship. 261 They also support raising a
presumption in favor of finding a committed relationship if it is
shown that the decedent and the individual shared a common
household for at least five years.262 The study supports modifying
the Draft to include more examples of observable symbols of part-
ners' feelings of commitment, such as joint gifts to charity or an
exchange of a symbol of the relationship. The findings also support
adding one or more of these indicators to the list of those raising a
presumption in favor of finding a committed relationship.
Relying on the indicators specified in this study and those
that may be generated by future studies enhances the likelihood
that meaningful characteristics of committed relationships will be
used. The indicators developed in this study are based on the re-
259. See supra p. 45.
260. See supra notes 127-139 and accompanying text (describing the approach
taken in the Waggoner Working Draft to define a committed relationship).
261. See Appendix, § (d), infra p. 92-93.
262. See Appendix,. § (e), infra p. 93.
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spondents' self-defining characteristics as well as our own precon-
ceived characteristics of a committed relationship. The combina-
tion of methods means that the identified indicators reflect the
lived experiences of opposite-sex and same-sex partners and not
just characteristics that we have superimposed on committed rela-
tionships. This technique provides a partial response to the con-
cerns that are likely to arise concerning assimilation and the use of
marriage as the standard for determining commitment. 263 We
want to be cautious, however, not to overstate the benefit of rely-
ing on empirical studies for this purpose. Reporting findings inevi-
tably emphasizes predominating responses and obscures outlying
ones with the result that the latter have little influence in devel-
oping the factors for defining committed relationships. Because
synthesis of empirical results tends to prefer similarities and to
explain away deviations from prevailing patterns, we need to be
careful about how we use the results within this highly contested
context.
The Hawaii approach, relying nearly exclusively on self-
identification, avoids having to develop defining characteristics of
a committed relationship. 264 It has the further advantage of
keeping the state from invading the privacy of committed couples
in the process of determining whether sufficient evidence exists to
conclude that a claimant was a committed partner of a decedent.
It does so, however, at the cost of leaving those who, for whatever
reason, fail to sign a declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relation-
ship unprotected by an intestacy statute. One response might be
to create a dual system in which a state adopts a registration sys-
tem but also provides inheritance rights to a claimant who can
otherwise show that a committed relationship existed between the
claimant and the decedent. 265 Although a dual system may seem
to embrace the advantages of both systems, it may also perpetuate
the disadvantages of each. Further study is necessary to assess
how a dual system might operate. Several questions should be in-
vestigated: How would the option to sign a declaration affect
committed relationships? Will the effects differ depending on
whether the relationship is same-sex or opposite-sex? Should a
partner of a committed relationship for which there is a signed
263. See supra pp. 109-10 (discussing social and political implications of treating
a committed partner as an heir); supra p. 27 (discussing implications of using
"marriage-like relationship" as a standard for evaluating same-sex and opposite-
sex relationships).
264. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C -4 to-5 (Michie Supp. 1997).
265. See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 86-87 (considering the effect of state-wide
registration of committed relationships).
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declaration receive a greater share of the intestate estate than a
partner of a committed relationship for which there is no signed
declaration?
III. Children of Committed Partners
To evaluate more fully public attitudes about the committed
partner and committed relationships, we engaged in a broader in-
quiry about family units headed by committed partners by in-
cluding questions involving a partner's child. One purpose in ask-
ing these questions was to assess the appropriate share, if any,
passing to the surviving partner when the partner has children
who are not also the children of the decedent. 266 Another purpose
of this line of inquiry was to determine whether further studies
should be conducted regarding treating a partner's child as an
heir. Section A describes the current law regarding parent-child
relationships to clarify who is considered a child of the decedent
and who is considered a child of the partner for inheritance pur-
poses. Section B describes the public attitudes about treating a
partner's child as an heir and the implications of those findings for
treating a committed partner as an heir.
A. Legal Treatment of Parent-Child Relationships within
Family Units Headed by Committed Partners
Committed partners may have children from prior relation-
ships, children together or both. Children whom the couple has
together may include children who are the biological or adopted
children of both partners. 267 Committed couples also may have a
child who is conceived or adopted by one partner during the rela-
tionship with the intention that the child would be reared by both
partners. The law in most states may not recognize the other
partner as a parent, and other legal constraints prevent the other
partner from adopting the child. 268 This section describes how the
current law of intestacy and related statutes define parent-child
relationships in terms of biological, adoptive and marital ties with
266. For discussion of treatment of legal spouses under inheritance law in the
context of blended families, see supra notes 217-221 and accompanying text.
267. For an extended discussion of the law regarding parent-child relationships
within family units headed by same-sex partners, see Christensen, supra note 1, at
1391-1414.
268. This probably occurs more frequently, but not exclusively, in family units
headed by same-sex partners. Opposite-sex partners who marry can avoid many of
the problems that otherwise arise for unmarried committed partners trying to
have both partners recognized as the legal parent of their child.
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the effect of denying recognition of parent-child relationships
based exclusively on social ties.269
When one partner has a biological or adopted child from a
prior relationship, the other partner's relationship to the child re-
sembles a stepparent relationship. That partner is not a steppar-
ent, however, because the partners are not legally married. 270 In
general, stepchildren do not inherit from stepparents, and commit-
ted partners' children from prior relationships are treated simi-
larly. In both family situations, the child is not given inheritance
rights to the estate of the spouse or partner of the child's parent.271
That is true even though the decedent may have participated in
the rearing of the child for a substantial number of years, contrib-
uted financially to the support of the child or otherwise become in-
volved emotionally in the well-being of the child while the child
was a minor, after the child attained adulthood or both.272
When an opposite-sex committed couple has a biological child
together, the child is considered a nonmarital child of each part-
ner. 273 Although historically the common law labeled the nonmari-
tal child as "fihius nulius" (the child of no one), in most states today
269. The issue of parent-child relationships affects the share going to a dece-
dent's legal spouse and is relevant in designing the share to a committed partner.
See supra notes 219-221 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of legal
spouses under inheritance law). It also concerns the question of whether a person
can inherit from the decedent as the decedent's child. In addition, it raises the
question of whether a person can inherit from the decedent as decedent's parent,
sibling or other collateral heir. In other words, recognition of a parent-child rela-
tionship determines the reciprocal heirship rights of the child and the parent as
well as the reciprocal heirship rights of the child and other family members of the
parent. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 114-15
(Supp. 1997) (establishing the circumstances under which a parent-child relation-
ship exists and the circumstances in which a parent may inherit from a child).
270. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 1-101(14), 9 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1997) (defining
stepparent).
271. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 114-15
(Supp. 1997) (excluding by omission stepchildren from definition of parent-child
relationship).
272. See id. California, however, has enacted a statute that entitles a stepchild
to inherit from or through stepparents if "the relationship of parent and child" be-
gan "during the person's minority and continued throughout the [parties'] joint
lifetimes" and if "[iut is established by clear and convincing evidence that the ...
stepparent would have adopted the person but for a legal barrier." CAL. PROB.
CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 1997).
A strict interpretation of the term stepparent would preclude this type of stat-
ute from applying to a committed partner's child from a prior relationship.
273. See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR., ET AL., WILLS TRUSTS AND ESTATES 32-40
(1988) (describing history and policy regarding nonmarital children and inheri-
tance law).
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a nonmarital child may inherit from both parents' estates upon
proof of parentage. 274
Obtaining legal recognition of parent-child relationships can
be more difficult when committed couples have a child through as-
sisted conception. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act (hereinafter USCACA)275 represents one of the
most comprehensive statutes addressing parent-child relationships
arising from assisted conception. 276 The parent-child relationship
determined under the USCACA controls for purposes of intestate
succession. 277 It provides that the gestational mother is the child's
mother, removing any question about the parent-child relationship
between the gestational mother and the child.278 The mother's
partner is not recognized as a parent of the child. Only "the hus-
band of a woman who bears a child through assisted conception" is
regarded as the father of the child.279 It is unlikely that courts
274. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 114-15
(Supp. 1997) ('[For purposes of intestate succession.., an individual is the child
of his [or her] natural parents, regardless of their marital status."); Ralph C.
Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 93, 113-16 (explaining that nonmarital child must prove paternity to inherit
from father); Michael J. Dale, The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Nonmarital
Children Mixed Blessings, 5 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 523, 541-44 (1989) (explaining that
the United States Supreme Court does not allow discrimination of nonmarital
children as compared to marital children in inheritance cases, although it allows
statutory limitations on nonmarital children's rights if paternity is not estab-
lished). Proof of parentage is unlikely to arise under these circumstances because
both parents are receiving the child into their home and openly holding the child
out as their own. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4), 9B U.L.A. 299 (1987) (listing
specific circumstances that include the alleged father having received the child
into his home and having openly held the child out as his natural child).
The parents are also heirs of the child in this situation because both parents
are openly treating the child as theirs and neither are refusing to support the
child. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 115
(Supp. 1997) (establishing criteria for parents to be able to inherit from their chil-
dren).
275. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT §§ 1-16, 9B
U.L.A. 198-210 (Supp. 1997).
276. To date, only North Dakota and Virginia have adopted the USCACA. See
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -07 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -159
(Michie Supp. 1997).
277. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT §10, 9B
U.L.A. 209 (controlling for purposes of probate law exemptions, allowance and
other protections for children in a parent's estate as well as for determining class
gift membership).
278. See id. §2, 9B U.L.A. 199.
279. See id. §3, 9B U.L.A. 199; cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301-02
(1987) (stating that if a woman is artificially inseminated by a man not her hus-
band, "the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived").
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would be willing to treat a partner as the equivalent of a spouse
under these types of statutes. 28 0
Gay couples face other legal problems when they want one of
the partners to be the biological father of a child they intend to
rear together. They not only have to rely on assisted conception,
but they also have to enter into surrogacy arrangements with the
280. See Chambers, supra note 94, at 465-69 (describing legal problems faced by
lesbian and gay couples having a child by artificial insemination or through the
use of a surrogate mother and arguing for the same automatic registering of par-
enthood available to married couples); Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child
Relationship in an Age of Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance,
29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 117-18 (1994) (proposing a statute that would ac-
knowledge a parent-child relationship between the partner of the birth parent and
the child).
A second issue concerning donor insemination is the legal relationship, if any,
of the sperm donor to the child born of assisted conception. If a woman chooses
anonymous donor insemination, questions concerning the father-child relationship
are unlikely to arise. If a woman chooses a known donor, issues regarding a ge-
netic father's legal obligations and rights can arise. Similar questions could also
arise regarding egg donors. The USCACA, § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 1997), pre-
cludes any relationship between the sperm donor and the child; in contrast, the
UPA, § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301-02 (1987), by its statutory terms, only precludes a par-
ent-child relationship where, the artificial insemination procedure was performed
by a licensed physician and the woman inseminated was married. Proof of genetic
paternity, under many inheritance statutes, including the UPC, § 2-114(a), 8
U.L.A. 114 -15 (Supp. 1997), might be sufficient to permit inheritance by the child
from or through a known donor. See McAllister, supra, at 79-83; cf., e.g., Jhordan
C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 531, 538 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the sperm
donor's parental rights were not extinguished under the state statute where donor
provided sperm directly to a child's mother without physician assistance and
awarding visitation rights to sperm donor for child being reared by a birth mother
and her lesbian partner); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 27 (Colo. 1989) (holding that an
agreement between an unmarried woman and a sperm donor to treat donor as fa-
ther of the child could override a statute intended to protect the woman from a pa-
ternity claim of the donor and remanding the case to determine if such an agree-
ment existed); Hartman v. Stassis, 504 N.W.2d 129, 130-31 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)
(ordering child support upon petition of a lesbian mother on behalf of her two chil-
dren born to her as a result of sexual intercourse with defendant); Thomas S. v.
Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (App. Div. 1994) (awarding order of filiation to a
sperm donor who was known to his child as her father over objections of the child's
lesbian mothers); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 240 (Or. Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 495 U.S. 905 (1989) (holding that statute excluding sperm donor's parental
rights applies even though artificial insemination was not performed by a doctor,
but acknowledging that if there is an agreement between mother and sperm donor
stating their intention to allow parental rights to sperm donor, then statute vio-
lates donor's constitutional due process rights). See generally Fred A. Bernstein,
This Child Does Have Two Mothers . . . And a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 52-58 (1996) (proposing that legal recognition should be
given to relationships between sperm donors and their children where the mother
gives consent); Nancy D. Polikoff, Brief, The Social Construction of Parenthood in
One Planned Lesbian Family, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 203, 203 (1996)
(discussing author's involvement in Thomas S. v. Robin Y. litigation, 618 N.Y.S.
2d. 356, and arguing that parenthood can be defined by a child in a lesbian family
without regard to biology).
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gestational mother. The legality of surrogacy agreements between
biological fathers and gestational mothers varies widely among the
states, reflecting a host of ethical concerns about these agree-
ments.28 1 Even if a surrogacy arrangement is successful, the non-
biological partner is not recognized as the child's parent.28 2
Similar problems can arise if committed couples decide to
adopt. The majority of jurisdictions currently do not allow unmar-
ried couples to adopt a child jointly but do allow unmarried adults
to adopt.283 Therefore, the couple is left with the option of having
one partner adopt the child, leaving the other partner with no le-
gal ties to the child.28 4
When presented with situations in which one partner be-
comes a parent by assisted conception or adoption and the other
partner seeks parental status to the child through adoption, some
281. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT §§ 5-9, alt.
§5, 9B U.L.A. 201-07 (Supp. 1997); Chambers, supra note 94, at 468-69 (noting
that some states render surrogacy agreements unenforceable, some do not ac-
knowledge surrogacy agreements but do not prohibit them if parties agree to carry
it out, and others enforce them if parties meet state requirements); Maria J. Hol-
landsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A
Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183, 201-07 (1995)
(explaining that USCACA is the foundation for the three different types of state
surrogacy statutes and describing states' various approaches).
282. It is possible for opposite-sex couples to enter into surrogacy arrangements,
but they can avoid the legal problems described in the text by marrying.
283. Most state statutes do not expressly prohibit joint adoptions by unmarried
couples, but courts rarely allow such adoptions. See HAYDEN CURRY ET AL., A
LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 3-4 to 3-5 (7th ed. 1993). Most state
adoption statutes confer standing to adopt on "any adult," "husband and wife to-
gether," "unmarried adult," or similar language. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-5
(1992) (any person may adopt, including a single parent); ALASKA STAT. §
25.23.020 (Michie 1996) ("Husband and wife together; unmarried adult" may
adopt); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-2 (1984) ("any person not married. .. or any husband
and wife jointly" may adopt); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48-82(1)(a), (b) (West 1997) ('[a]
husband and wife jointly" or "[an] unmarried adult" may adopt); see also UNIF.
ADOPTION ACT, § 1-102, 9 U.L.A- 7 (Supp. 1997) ("[a]ny individual may adopt").
But see Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (holding that the
state adoption statute does not prohibit same-sex committed partners from jointly
adopting a child who is the biological child of one of the partners); In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that a couple, homosexual or heterosexual,
does not have to be married to adopt together a child who is the biological child of
one of the partners); Corky Siemaszko, N.J. Gay Pair Adopt Boy, DAILY NEWS, Oct.
23, 1997, at 10 (describing holding of a New Jersey Superior Court allowing a gay
couple to adopt a child simultaneously).
284. In this case the individual partner most typically would be adopting the
child in the conventional manner, meaning adopting a child with whom the adop-
tive parent had no previous relationship. When a conventional adoption occurs,
the biological parents relinquish all parental rights and responsibilities. See Marc
E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-Use of Social
Science Research, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 207, 207 (1995). Thus, in a con-
ventional adoption, the adoptive family completely substitutes for the biological
family.
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courts have been willing to construe existing adoption statutes
broadly to permit both partners to be recognized as the parents of
the child for all purposes, including inheritance.2 5 The adoption
and related statutes typically provide that an adoption terminates
the parental rights of the child's legal parent unless the petitioner
is the child's stepparent.2s6 Although some courts refuse to allow
the adoption because the petitioner fails to qualify as a stepparent,
other courts refuse to read the statute "literally and restrictively
where to do so would defeat the best interests of the children and
produce a wholly absurd and untenable result."28 7
The Uniform Adoption Act 288 (UAA) is one of the few in-
stances in which a legislative attempt was made to facilitate joint
parenting arrangements between committed couples. 289 The UAA
285. See, e.g., In re Baby Z., No. 105695, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1091, at *36
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1996); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d, at 321 (Mass.
1993); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 536 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992);
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993). But see, e.g., In re Adoption
of T.K.J. & K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488, 490 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Angel Lace M.,
516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1994). When allowing second-parent adoptions, the
courts have not distinguished between family situations in which one of the par-
ents is biologically related to the child and those in which one of the parents had
previously adopted the child. Compare In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 840
(D.C. 1995) (holding that a gay man may adopt a child jointly with his partner
where that partner had previously adopted that child) with Adoption of Tammy,
619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (holding that a lesbian may adopt a child jointly with
her lesbian partner where the child is the biological child of that partner born as a
result of reproductive technology).
Second-parent adoption is the term frequently used in the literature to refer to
an adoption by the committed partner of the child's legal parent that does not re-
sult in the termination of the legal parent's relationship with the child. See Max-
well S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption: Overcoming Barriers to Lesbian Family
Rights, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175, 176 (1995). The term is used to contrast it
with stepparent adoption. See id. at 181.
286. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312 (a) (1997) (adoption statute terminating
rights of parent except in case of stepparent adoption). UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
114 (b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 114-15 (Supp. 1997) (inheritance statute termi-
nating right to inherit by parent except in case of stepparent adoption).
287. In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d at 538.
288. 9 U.L.A. 6-114 (1994).
289. In contrast, a few legislatures have enacted statutes banning adoptions by
lesbians and gay men. See, e.g., FLA STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-B:2 (XV), B:4, F:6 (1994); see also Cox v. Florida Dep't of
Health & Rehabilitative Serv., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995) (rejecting a constitu-
tional challenge to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3)); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530
A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 170-B:2 (XV), B:4, F:6); Victor Epstein, Is Adoption Ruling Appeal-Proof?,
BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 5, 1997, at Al (describing Amer v. Florida, No.
92-14370 (11) (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 27, 1997), which rejected a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Florida statute).
The Hawaii legislation addresses this problem. The Hawaii statute having to
do with parent-child relationships for inheritance purposes was amended to pro-
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provides that "[flor good cause shown, a court may allow an indi-
vidual who [is not a stepparent], but has the consent of the custo-
dial parent of a minor to file a petition for adoption," and that "[a]
petition allowed under this subsection must be treated as if the pe-
titioner were a stepparent."290 Through this approach, the UAA
avoided defining a committed partner and left it to the courts to
determine whether "good cause" is shown to warrant treating a pe-
titioning committed partner as a stepparent. 29' Extending the
right to adopt may not be a satisfactory response for purposes of
intestacy. Intestacy laws are designed for persons who have not
exercised their private law-making opportunities, such as execut-
ing a will or will substitutes.292 Those same persons might not
vide that adoption by the reciprocal beneficiary of a biological or adopting parent
has no effect on the relationship between the child and that biological or adopting
parent or the child's right to inherit from or through the other biological or adopt-
ing parent. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2.114(b) (Michie Supp. 1997). The
legislation, however, fails to extend Hawaii's antilapse statute to children of a re-
ciprocal beneficiary. It continues to apply only to stepchildren. See id. at § 560:2-
603(b) (1997). The statute provides that, if the testator fails to provide otherwise,
the lineal descendants of a stepchild who predeceases the testator take the step-
child's share. For a child of a reciprocal beneficiary who predeceases the testator,
the devise to the child will fail and not pass to the child's lineal descendants.
290. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-102, 9 U.L.A. 67.
291. It cannot be doubted that the drafters intended to reach adoption by a
committed partner of a child's parent.
In addition to permitting individuals who are within the formal definition
of "stepparent" to adopt a minor stepchild under this Article, Section 4-
102 allows an individual who is a de facto stepparent, but is not, or is no
longer, married to the custodial parent, to adopt as if he or she were a de
jure stepparent. To file a petition under this Article, the de facto steppar-
ent or "second parent" has to have the consent of the court and the custo-
dial parent, whose parental rights will not be terminated by an adoption
under this Article. In addition, for the court to grant the petition, the
other requirements of this Article have to be met, including the court's de-
termination that the adoption is in the minor adoptee's best interests.
Id. § 4-102 cmt. 67 (citing Matter of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992), and
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993)).
For further discussion of second-parent adoptions, see Suzanne Bryant, Sec-
ond Parent Adoption: A Model Brief, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 233 (1995);
Elovitz, supra note 284; Deborah Lashman, Second Parent Adoption: A Personal
Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER LAW & POLY 227 (1995); Charlotte J. Patterson,
Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspec-
tive, 2 DUKE J. GENDER LAW & POL'Y 191 (1995); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children
of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1025 (1992); Peltz, supra
note 285; Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Par-
enthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontradi-
tional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990); Wendell Ricketts & Roberta Achtenberg,
Adoption and Foster Parenting for Lesbians and Gay Men: Creating New Tradi-
tions in Family, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND FAMILY RELATIONS 83 (Frederick W.
Bozett & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1990); Carmella Stella, When a Mother is a Le-
gal Stranger to Her Child: The Law's Challenge to the Lesbian Nonbiological
Mother, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 135 (1991).
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pursue adoption, even when it is available, raising the question of
whether the intestacy statute should rely exclusively on adoption
and other related statutes to define parent-child relationships. 293
As this discussion demonstrates, the law's failure to recognize
committed relationships leads to a failure to recognize parent-child
relationships. The attention traditionally paid to the best interests
of the children probably explains the relative success that partners
have enjoyed in obtaining legal ties to their children through adop-
tion.294 The effect of these recent legal developments, however, is
to confer legal status upon family units headed by committed
partners and to recognize ongoing committed relationships. 295
B. Findings
1. Scenarios
This subsection first describes the respondents' distributive
preferences when interviewers presented them with scenarios in
which the decedent's partner had predeceased the decedent leav-
ing a child who was unrelated to the decedent biologically or
through adoption. The subsection then describes the respondents'
distributive preferences when interviewers presented them with
scenarios in which the decedent was survived by a partner as well
as by the partner's child. For both sets of scenarios, the findings
reveal public attitudes toward family units headed by committed
partners that implicate the treatment of a committed partner as
an heir.
Partner Predeceased the Decedent Leaving a Child. To assess
public attitudes about the heirship of a child whom the decedent's
partner conceived or adopted during the relationship and whom
the partner and decedent reared together, the interviewers pre-
sented respondents with Scenario E:
292. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also supra note 245
(discussing will substitutes).
293. Cf. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 58, at 131 (discussing the scope of the
court-made doctrine of equitable adoption, which permits children who have not
been formally or legally adopted to inherit by intestacy from their foster parents).
294. See Peltz, supra note 285, at 177-78.
295. See id. at 177-78, 187 (making these points specifically regarding lesbian
committed couples). The legal developments discussed in the text are distinguish-
able from the growing body of law discussed earlier that allocates rights and obli-
gations between partners once their relationship has terminated. See supra notes
96-112 and accompanying text. When courts address property divisions upon the
termination of a relationship, to a large extent, rather than recognizing the legal
status of family units headed by committed partners, they are protecting individ-
ual claimants and not ongoing family units.
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In the next situation, suppose that the opposite-sex partner
conceived or adopted a child during the relationship and that
the person who dies had no biological or adoptive relationship
to the child. However, the couple raised the child together as
their own. In addition, the person who dies had a child from a
prior relationship who had also lived in the couple's house-
hold. Both children are now over 18. When the person dies,
their partner had already died and only the two children are
living. What percentage of the estate would you give to the
person's child from the prior relationship? What percentage of
the estate would you give to the deceased partner's child that
the couple raised together?
Under prevailing law, the decedent's child from a prior
relationship would inherit the entire estate. 296
The decedent's child from a prior relationship who was reared
in the committed couple's household was chosen as the competing
claimant to the child conceived or adopted by the decedent's part-
ner during the relationship because we hypothesized that this
would be the most likely case where the respondents would not
share the estate with the partner's child. Traditionally, both le-
gally and socially, biological or adopted children are viewed as
having a superior claim over anyone else to inherit.297
The overwhelming response in each sample was to distribute
the decedent's estate equally between the two children. 298 When
the respondents were asked if they would distribute the estate dif-
ferently if the partners had been the same sex, the overwhelming
majority in each sample indicated that their distributive choices
would stay the same. 29 9
296. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(1) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 107 (Supp.
1997); see also supra notes 276-84 and accompanying text (describing law that pre-
vents a decedent from being treated as a parent of a partner's child).
297. Under prevailing inheritance laws, the children do share with the dece-
dent's legal spouse. See Waggoner, supra note 16, at 36-38 (explaining the intes-
tacy pattern of providing for the spouse by reducing, and in some instances elimi-
nating, the share passing to the children on the basis of relative financial need and
that the spouse plays the role of conduit to the children by providing for the chil-
dren's needs during their minority and giving them any unconsumed portion at
death).
298. See Table 10 infra p. 74.
299. Of the respondents in the general public, 92.7% (+/-5.8%) indicated no
change in their distributive choices. The same was true for 97.0% of the respon-
dents with opposite-sex partners and 100% of the respondents with same-sex part-
ners. Of those respondents who gave a share of the estate to the partner's child,
93.2% (+/-5.8%) of the general public, 96.8% of respondents with opposite-sex part-
ners, and 100% of respondents with same-sex partners, indicated that they would
not change their distributive choices if the partners had been the same sex.
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Table 10. Distribution Patterns for Scenario E: Decedent
Survived by Own Child From a Prior Relationship and
Partner's Child that the Couple Reared Together
General Respondents Respondents
Public with with Same-
Sample Opposite-Sex Sex Partners
Partners
Percent Distribution to:
Person's Partner's
Child Child,
reared
together (%) (%) (%)
100 0 10.5 6.1 0.8
51-99 1-49 4.7 0.0 3.0
50 50 80.2 87.9 90.2
1-49 51-99 3.5 3.0 6.0
0 100 1.2 3.0 0.0
Total N 86 33 133
In Scenario E,300 the committed couple's relationship began
before the birth or adoption of the partner's child. To test further
the public attitudes about treating a partner's child as an heir,
Scenario F involved a situation in which the committed couple's
relationship began after the birth or adoption of the partner's
child:
The person and their opposite-sex partner each had a child
from a prior relationship. Both children had lived in the cou-
ple's household and are now over 18. Suppose that when the
person dies, the partner had already died and only the two
children are living. What percentage of the estate would you
give to the child of the person who dies? What percentage of
the estate would you give to the deceased partner's child who
had lived in the couple's household?
Under prevailing law, the decedent's child from a prior
relationship would inherit the decedent's entire estate.30
300. See Scenario E supra p. 73.
301. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(1) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 107 (Supp.
1997); see also supra notes 270-272 and accompanying text (describing law that
prevents a decedent from being treated as a parent of a partner's child for inheri-
tance purposes).
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Again, the decedent's child from a prior relationship who had
lived in the committed couple's household was chosen as the com-
peting claimant to the partner's child because we hypothesized
that this would be the most likely case where the respondents
would not share the estate with the partner's child. A substantial
majority of respondents in each sample divided the estate equally
between the two adult children (72.1% of the general public sam-
ple; 81.8% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners; 90.2% of
the respondents with same-sex partners).302 A comparison of the
results of Scenarios E and F indicates that the respondents did not
distinguish between the partner's child conceived or adopted dur-
ing the relationship and the partner's child from a prior relation-
ship who had lived in the couple's household. Over two-thirds of
the respondents in each sample gave the partner's child 50% of the
estate in both scenarios (68.6% of the general public sample, 75.8%
of the respondents with opposite-sex partners and 82.4% of the re-
spondents with same-sex partners). When the respondents were
asked if they would distribute the estate differently if the partners
had been the same sex, the overwhelming majority in each sample
indicated that their distributive choices would stay the same.
30 3
302. See Table 11 infra p. 76.
303. Of the respondents in the general public, 89.2% (+/-8.0%) indicated no
change in their distributive choices. The same was true for 100% of the respon-
dents with opposite-sex partners and 99.3% of the respondents with same-sex
partners. Of those respondents who gave a share of the estate to the partner's
child, 89.6% (+/-9.0%) of the general public, 100% of respondents with opposite-sex
partners, and 100% of respondents with same-sex partners indicated that they
would not change their distributive choices if the partners had been the same sex.
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Table 11. Distribution Patterns for Scenario F: Decedent
Survived by Own Child from a Prior Relationship and
Partner's Child from a Prior Relationship
General Respondents Respondents
Public with with
Sample Opposite-Sex Same-Sex
Partners Partners
Percent Distribution to:
Person's Partner's
Child Child (%) (%) (%)
100 0 18.6 12.1 3.0
51-99 1-49 8.1 6.1 6.0
50 50 72.1 81.8 90.2
1-49 51-99 1.2 0.0 0.0
0 100 0.0 0.0 0.8
Total N 86 33 133
The respondents were asked to consider one more situation in
which the decedent's partner predeceased the decedent. The in-
terviewers presented the respondents with Scenario G:
[T]he opposite-sex partner died leaving a child from a prior
relationship who had lived in the couple's household. This
child is now over 18 and the couple had no other children.
Suppose that when the person dies, their partner had already
died and only their own parents and the partner's child are
living. What percentage of the estate would you give to the
parents of the person who dies? What percentage of the estate
would you give to the deceased partner's child who had lived
in the couple's household?
Under prevailing law, the decedent's parents would inherit the
entire estate. 30 4
Given the respondents' willingness to share the decedent's es-
tate between the decedent's own child and the partner's child, it is
not surprising that a substantial majority of the respondents with
opposite-sex partners (75.8%) and nearly all of the respondents
with same-sex partners (90.2%) gave the partner's child half or
304. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(2) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 107 (Supp.
1997); see also supra notes 270-272 and accompanying text (describing law that
prevents a decedent from being treated as a parent of a partner's child for inheri-
tance purposes).
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more of the decedent's estate when the competing claimant was
the decedent's parents. A substantial majority of the respondents
in the general public sample (79.1%) gave the partner's child a
share of the estate. 305 They were equally likely to give half or less
of the estate to the partner's child as to give half or more. When
the respondents were asked if they would distribute the estate dif-
ferently if the partners had been the same sex, the overwhelming
majority in each sample indicated that their distributive choices
would stay the same. 306
Table 12. Distribution Patterns for Scenario G: Decedent
Survived by Partner's Child from a Prior Relationship
and Decedent's Parents
General Respondents Respondents
Public with with
Sample Opposite-Sex Same-Sex
Partners Partners
Percent Distribution to:
Deceased Deceased
Partner's Partner's
Child Parents (%) (%) (%)
100 0 20.9 21.2 33.1
51-99 1-49 10.5 18.2 23.3
50 50 37.2 36.4 33.8
1-49 51-99 10.5 9.1 8.3
0 100 20.9 15.2 1.5
Total N 86 33 133
For all three of the scenarios that included a partner's child
as a potential taker, Scenarios E,307 F,308 and G,309 the respondents
305. The margin of error is +/-10.0%.
306. Of the respondents in the general public, 87.7% (+/-9.6%) indicated no
change in their distributive choices. The same was true for 100% of the respon-
dents with opposite-sex partners and 97.0% of the respondents with same-sex
partners. Of those respondents who gave a share of the estate to the partner's
child, 90.6% (+/-10.8%) of the general public, 100% of respondents with opposite-
sex partners, and 96.9% of respondents with same-sex partners, indicated that
they would not change their distributive choices if the partners had been the same
sex.
307. See Scenario E supra p. 73.
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in all three groups consistently gave the partner's child a share of
the decedent's estate. The results are inconsistent with current
law, which provides that the partner's child receives no share of a
decedent's estate. 310 For Scenarios E and F, the results are incon-
sistent with a basic principle of intestacy law that treats the dece-
dent's child as an exclusive heir, unless the decedent is survived by
a legal spouse.3 11 Based on Scenarios E and F one might conclude
that public attitudes support treating the partner's child as a child
of the decedent for all purposes under the intestacy law. The re-
sults of Scenario G, however, cast doubt on that conclusion. If the
respondents were treating the partner's child as a child of the de-
cedent, one would have expected that they would have given the
entire estate to the partner's child in Scenario G, in which they
were asked to distribute the estate between the partner's child and
the decedent's parents. Perhaps the reason the partner's child re-
ceived half of the estate in both Scenarios E and F is because the
respondents embraced a principle of equality among children,
rather than a view that the status of the children is irrelevant.
The principle of equality among children may explain the respon-
dents' tendency not to treat any child unfavorably.
The favorable treatment of the partner's child is further re-
vealed by comparing the responses to Scenarios A 3 12 and G. In
both scenarios, the decedent's parents are the competing claimants
to the members of the family unit-the partner in Scenario A and
the partner's child in Scenario G-that had been headed by com-
mitted partners. Although over 48% of the respondents in the
general public sample gave the same share to the partner's child in
Scenario G as they gave to the partner in Scenario A, nearly 32%
of them gave the partner's child in Scenario G more than they gave
the partner in Scenario A. Similarly, although over 42% of the re-
spondents with opposite-sex partners gave the same share to the
partner's child in Scenario G as they gave to the partner in Sce-
nario A, over 33% of them gave the partner's child in Scenario G
more than they gave the partner in Scenario A. This counter-
intuitive preference for the partner's child over the partner by a
substantial minority of respondents in these two sample groups
308. See Scenario F supra p. 74.
309. See Scenario G supra p. 76.
310. See supra notes 270-284 and accompanying text.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 213-221.
312. See Scenario A supra p. 37.
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reinforces the conclusion that the respondents did not view the
partner as the equivalent of a legal spouse. 313
Of the respondents with same-sex partners, over 42% gave
the same share to the partner's child in Scenario G as they gave to
the partner in Scenario A. Their responses differed from those ob-
tained from the other two samples, however, in that over 53% of
them gave more to the partner in Scenario A than they did to the
partner's child in Scenario G. This difference in responses is due
largely to those respondents with same-sex partners who gave the
partner the entire estate but who gave the partner's child half or
more of the estate, but not all of it.
Partner and Partner's Child Survive the Decedent. To assess
further what respondents are signifying when they include a
committed partner as an heir or when they include a partner's
child as an heir, the interviewers presented the respondents with
Scenario H:
Mhe person and their opposite-sex partner had a child to-
gether, which means that they both have an adoptive or bio-
logical relationship to this child. In addition, the partner had
a child from a prior relationship who had also lived in the
couple's household. Both children are now over 18. When the
person dies, how would you divide the estate between the cou-
ple's child, the partner's child, and the partner? What per-
centage of the estate would you give to the couple's child?
What percentage of the estate would you give to the partner's
child who had also lived in the couple's household? What per-
centage of the estate would you give to the partner of the per-
son who dies?
Under prevailing law, the decedent's child, who is also the child of
the decedent's partner, would receive the entire estate. 31 4
This scenario was chosen because we wanted a scenario that
reflected the complexity found in family units headed by commit-
ted partners. The scenario presents a situation where respondents
might be likely to give a substantial share to the partner. Because
the couple had a child together, the respondents might be less
likely to discount the committed nature of the relationship. In ad-
dition, because the decedent's child is also a child of the partner,
the respondents might be less concerned about the decedent's child
313. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (comparing public attitudes to-
ward committed partners as heirs with public attitudes toward legal spouses as
heirs).
314. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(1) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 107 (Supp.
1997); See also supra text accompanying notes 78, 270-272 (describing law that
prevents a decedent from being treated as a parent of a partner's child for inheri-
tance purposes).
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subsequently being disinherited by the partner. The presence of
the partner's child from a prior relationship, however, might be a
reason for respondents to limit the share passing to the partner.
Although there was great variation in respondents' distribu-
tive preferences, several conclusions can be drawn. A substantial
majority of respondents in each of the samples gave something to
the partner (72.4% of the general public, 315 84.4% of the respon-
dents with opposite-sex partners and 97.7% of the respondents
with same-sex partners). 316 Similarly, a substantial majority of re-
spondents in each of the samples gave something to the partner's
child from a prior relationship (77.0% of the general public sam-
ple,3 17 81.3% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners and
69.2% of the respondents with same-sex partners). The majority of
the respondents in each sample gave a share of the estate to each
of the three survivors (59.8% of the general public sample; 71.9%
of the respondents with opposite-sex partners; and 66.9% of the re-
spondents with same-sex partners).
As under earlier scenarios, the majority of respondents gave
each child something and treated the children equally (60.9% of
the general public; 62.5% of the respondents with opposite-sex
partners; and 64.7% of the respondents with same-sex partners).
The proportion of respondents who treated the children equally in-
creases if respondents who disinherited both children and gave the
entire estate to the surviving partner are also considered (5.7% of
the general public; 6.3% of the respondents with opposite-sex
partners; and 24.8% of the respondents with same-sex partners).318
Given our previous findings, it is not surprising that the re-
spondents gave the surviving partner and the partner's child from
a prior relationship a share of the decedent's estate. It is surpris-
ing, however, that when the shares given to each in Scenario H are
combined, a majority of the respondents in each sample gave the
partner and the partner's child from a prior relationship over half
of the estate, leaving the decedent's own child (the couple's child)
315. The margin of error is +/- 9.6%.
316. See Table 13 infra p. 82.
317. The margin of error is +/- 9.0%.
318. The principle of equality among children was also detected in an earlier
empirical study that considered stepparent-stepchild relationships. See Contem-
porary Studies Project, A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Se-
lected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1041,
1094-95 (1978). Survey participants treated a decedent's child from a prior rela-
tionship the same as decedent's child from a current relationship when presented
with a scenario in which the decedent was survived by a legal spouse, an adult
child from the decedent's current marriage and an adult child from a prior rela-
tionship. See id.
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inheriting less than half of the estate (55.2% of the general public
sample; 68.8% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners; and
91.7% of the respondents with same-sex partners).319 Among re-
spondents with committed partners, 86.0% of those who have chil-
dren gave over half of the estate to the partner and the partner's
child from a prior relationship; 77.8% of those whose partners have
children that are not the respondents' own gave over half of the es-
tate to the partner and the partner's child from a prior relation-
ship. These results probably do not reflect the respondents' pref-
erence for the partner and the partner's child from a prior
relationship over the decedent's child (the couple's child). Instead,
they may be a byproduct of the respondents' preference for treat-
ing children in the family unit equally. If we had presented a sce-
nario in which the decedent had more than one child and the part-
ner had only one child from a prior relationship, then it is likely
that the share of the estate going to the partner and the partner's
child from a prior relationship would be reduced as respondents
divided some portion of the estate equally among all of the chil-
dren in the family unit. When the respondents were asked if they
would distribute the estate differently if the surviving partner
were of the same sex as the decedent, the overwhelming majority
in each sample indicated that their distributive choices would stay
the same. 320
319. The margin of error is +/- 10.5%.
320. Of the respondents in the general public, 84.3% (+/-7.8%) indicated no
change in their distributive choices. The same was true for 98.5% of the respon-
dents with opposite-sex partners and 97.0% of the respondents with same-sex
partners. Of those respondents who gave a share of the estate to the surviving
partner, 82.0% (+/-9.8%) of the respondents from the general public sample, 99.2%
of the respondents with opposite-sex partners, and 96.3% of the respondents with
same-sex partners did not change their distributive choices when the surviving
partner was of the same sex as the decedent.
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Table 13. Distribution Patterns for Scenario H: Decedent
Survived by Couple's Child, Partner's Child from a
Prior Relationship and Partner
General Respondents Respondents
Public with Oppo- with Same-
Sample site-Sex Sex Part-
Partners ners
Percent Distribution to:
Couple's Partner's Partner
Child Child (%) (%) (%)
100 0 0 10.3 6.3 0.0
50 50 0 13.8 9.4 1.5
50 0 50 4.6 6.3 4.5
50 25 25 10.3 9.4 1.5
33 33 33 24.1 28.1 18.0
25 25 50 23.0 12.5 30.8
0 0 100 5.7 6.3 24.8
Other
Pattern' 8.0 21.9 18.8
Total N 87 32 133
1For the 7 respondents in the general public sample in the other pattern, 6
gave less than 50% to the partner, although 4 gave something to the partner's
child. For the 7 respondents with opposite-sex partners in the other pattern, 5
gave less than 50% to partner, although all 7 gave something to the partner. All 7
gave something to the partner's child. For the 25 respondents with same-sex
partners in the other pattern, 18 gave 50% or more to the partner, 24 gave some-
thing to the partner, and 23 gave something to the partner's child.
The Waggoner Working Draft provides that the surviving
committed partner receive half of the intestate estate in Scenario
H and that the decedent's child receive the other half.321 For
same-sex couples, Hawaii provides that the surviving committed
partner receive $150,000 plus half of any balance of the intestate
estate and that the decedent's child receive the other half of the
balance of the estate.322 Under both of these intestacy schemes,
321. See Appendix, § (a)(2), infra p. 92; cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-103(1)
(amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 107 (Supp. 1997).
322. See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-102(4) (Michie Supp. 1997). The Hawaii
legislation does not apply to opposite-sex committed couples and, therefore, a de-
cedent's opposite-sex committed partner would receive nothing. See supra notes
148-150 and accompanying text.
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the fact that the surviving committed partner has a child from a
prior relationship is a basis for increasing the share that the dece-
dent's children would otherwise receive and decreasing the share
that the partner would otherwise receive. This reduction is based
on the common assumption that decedents would not want com-
mitted partners to receive as great a share because they are likely
to provide for a child from a prior relationship at the expense of a
decedent's child.323
The findings, however, indicate public support for a partner's
child from a prior relationship sharing in the decedent's estate,
suggesting the need to reconsider the reduction of the share to the
committed partner. The consistent preference for having a part-
ner's child share in the estate under a variety of family circum-
stances indicates that decedents might be quite supportive of
committed partners using their inheritance from the decedents to
provide for their own children and that committed partners might
be unlikely to disinherit the children of predeceased partners.
These conclusions remain provisional without further considera-
tion of the nature of the family units and the different types of re-
lationships that may exist between committed partners and their
respective children.
Although the purpose of presenting this set of scenarios was
to place the question of committed partner as heir within the con-
text of the complex family arrangements in which the legal change
would operate, the findings show substantial support for treating a
committed partner's child as an heir. Notwithstanding the pre-
liminary nature of the findings, three tentative conclusions can be
drawn from the results: (1) most respondents preferred to treat
children in family units headed by committed partners equally; (2)
most respondents did not want to disinherit a partner's child who
was not a child of the decedent; and (3) most respondents did not
want to treat the partner's child from a prior relationship as if that
child were a child of the decedent. The most important result from
this part of the study is that it reveals a number of issues that re-
quire further empirical study.324
323. For discussion of intestacy share passing to legal spouses in the context of
blended families, see supra text accompanying notes 217-221.
324. The respondents' preferences for including a partner's child who is not a
child of the decedent as an heir raise obvious questions about the current law's
treatment of stepchildren and blended families. Public attitudes regarding chil-
dren in family units headed by married couples may be different from attitudes
regarding children in family units headed by committed couples. The results from
this study suggest, however, that the treatment of stepchildren under the inheri-
tance law should be the subject of empirical study. See Contemporary Studies
Project, supra note 318, at 1094-95, 1117-19 (addressing some of the inheritance
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Further investigation is necessary to answer questions about
inheritance rights from or through the partner's child and from or
through the decedent's other family members.3 25 Further investi-
gation is also necessary to consider the effect on heirship if the
committed relationship terminates other than by death of one of
the partners or, if subsequent to the first partner's death, the sur-
viving partner repartners or marries. Should a partner's child
only be able to inherit from a decedent's estate if there is evidence
of a relationship between the decedent and that child? These
questions are part of the broader issue of the nature of the rela-
tionship between a partner and the other partner's child. Very lit-
tle information was obtained in this empirical study in relation to
that issue. The next subsection presents those limited findings.
2. Qualifying Relationships between Committed Partners
and Each Other's Children
If an intestacy statute were to take into account the couple's
relationship with each other's children when determining the
share passing to a committed partner, criteria would have to be es-
tablished for identifying qualifying partner-partner's child rela-
tionships. This same line of inquiry might ultimately prove useful
in identifying criteria for having a partner's child take as an .heir
under a decedent's estate. This study provides only minimal and
preliminary information for developing that criteria.
As described earlier, two situations can arise in which a child
of the family unit can be a partner's child without being a child of
the decedent. 326 The first situation is when a child is born to or
adopted by the decedent's partner during the committed couple's
relationship and then reared by the decedent and partner together
in their household. The second situation is when the partner has a
child from a prior relationship. These two situations raise differ-
issues regarding stepparents and stepchildren). Another issue raised by the find-
ings in this empirical study is whether the decedent's children would agree that
including the partner's child as an heir represents a fair distribution of the dece-
dent's estate. This issue would seem to be particularly important within the con-
text of an intestacy statute that is striving to promote familial harmony.
325. An empirical study might be designed to assess public attitudes about the
following types of issues: If a partner's child fails to survive the decedent, should
that child's lineal descendants share in the decedent's estate? Should a partner be
able to inherit as a parent from the other partner's child? Should a partner's child
be able to inherit from or through the other partner's family, such as the other
partner's children, siblings or ancestors?
326. See supra notes 270-291 and accompanying text (describing law that pre-
vents a decedent from being treated as a parent of a partner's child for inheritance
purposes).
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ent issues for purposes of determining heirship rights of the com-
mitted partner and the child.
In the first situation, under prevailing law in many states the
parent-child relationship between the decedent and the child is not
recognized. 327 The findings of Scenario E328 show overwhelming
public support for allowing this child to inherit from the dece-
dent.32 9 To consider changing the intestacy statute to reach this
result, however, seems to obscure the real issues. The problem
appears to lie in the definition of parent found in statutes having
to do with assisted conception and in restrictions on adoption by
unmarried committed couples. 330 Statutory change is called for,
but the solution should be made broader than just adjustment of
the intestacy laws.33 1
The second situation involving a partner's child from a prior
relationship raises a number of difficult issues. 332 In general, in
scenarios having to do with an adult child of the partner from a
prior relationship who lived in the couple's household as a minor,
the respondents treated that child as an appropriate heir of the
decedent.333 We speculated that a partner's child from a prior re-
lationship who did not live in the couple's household might be
treated less favorably by respondents. We reasoned that respon-
dents might use the distinction between living inside and outside
the household as an indirect way of evaluating the nature of the
relationship between the decedent and the partner's child. There-
fore, immediately following Scenario H,334 we presented respon-
dents with another scenario that was the same as Scenario H, ex-
cept that it indicated that the partner's child from a prior
relationship had not lived in the couple's household. When the
partner's child lived in the household, only 23.0% of the respon-
dents in the general public sample,335 18.7% of the respondents
with opposite-sex partners and 30.8% of the respondents with
same-sex partners gave the partner's child nothing. When the
partner's child did not live in the household, the percentage of re-
spondents who gave the partner's child nothing significantly in-
327. See supra notes 270-291 and accompanying text.
328. See Scenario E supra p. 73.
329. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 267-295 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 276-293 and accompanying text.
332. For a discussion of the legal treatment of the relationship between a part-
ner and her or his partner's child, see supra notes 270-272.
333. See supra notes 302-320 and accompanying text.
334. See Scenario H supra p. 79.
335. The margin of error is +/-9.0%.
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creased (51.6% of respondents from the general public sample;
59.4% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners; and 53.8% of
the respondents with same-sex partners).
A substantial number of respondents in each of the sample
groups gave more to the partner's child in Scenario H than they
gave to the partner's child under the modified version of Scenario
H. Over 47% of the respondents in the general public sample, over
56% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners and nearly 36%
of the respondents with same-sex partners gave less to the part-
ner's child when the child never lived in the couple's household
than when the child did live in the couple's household. Among
general public respondents who gave less to the partner's child,
the most common adjustment was to increase the share to the cou-
ple's child (45.0%).
In the other two groups, there were several prevalent pat-
terns of change in the distribution. Among the respondents with
opposite-sex partners, the most common adjustment was to in-
crease the shares of both the partner and the couple's child (27.8%)
and the next most common adjustments were either to increase
the share to the couple's child or to decrease the share to the cou-
ple's child and increase the share to the partner (22.2% each).
Among the respondents with same-sex partners, the most common
adjustment was to increase the share to the couple's child (38.3%)
and the next most common adjustment was to increase the shares
to the couple's child and the partner (29.8%).
These findings suggest that whether the child lived in the
committed couple's household might be a relevant factor in deter-
mining the share passing to the committed partner. If either a de-
cedent or a surviving committed partner had a child from a prior
relationship who did not live in the household, then that might be
a basis for decreasing the intestacy share passing to a committed
partner. Whether the child lived in the couple's household also
might be a relevant factor in determining the share, if any, passing
to the child. The survey, however, did not examine respondents'
subjective interpretations of what it means for a child to be "living
in the household." For some it might have meant that the dece-
dent had significant contact with the child. For others, it might
have meant that the decedent actively participated in the rearing
of the child, including financial support. For yet others, it might
have meant that the decedent had the same emotional and affec-
tionate attachments to the child as most parents would for their
biological or adopted children. Given the uncertainty of the sig-
nificance of whether children were reared inside or outside of the
[Vol. 16:1
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household, further study is necessary. Future research should fo-
cus on the actual nature of the relationship between a decedent
and a partner's child from a prior relationship.
In addition, consideration might also be given to the nature of
the committed couple's relationship when identifying qualifying
partner-partner's child relationships. For this purpose, it is useful
to reconsider the observable indicators characterizing a committed
couple's relationship that were discussed earlier. 36 Although
these are indicators characterizing the couple's relationship, they
may nevertheless relate well to the nature of the decedent's rela-
tionship with a partner's child from a prior relationship. We ex-
amined the association of the indicators to the distributive prefer-
ences for a partner's child using Scenario G, 337 in which the
respondents were asked to distribute the estate between the dece-
dent's parents and the partner's child from a prior relationship.
Again, we collapsed the distributive preferences of each sample
group, according to the dominant preference patterns of each, and
tested for an association with the observable indicators using
bivariate contingency table analysis. For respondents with
same-sex partners, the three categories reflecting the dominant
preferential patterns included: giving half or less of the estate to
the partner's child, giving over half of the estate to the partner's
child and giving all of the estate to the partner's child. For re-
spondents with opposite-sex partners, the three categories re-
flecting the dominant preferential patterns included: giving less
than half of the estate to the partner's child, giving half of the es-
tate to the partner's child and giving over half of the estate to the
partner's child.
For both sample groups, there were only a few observable
relationship indicators that were associated with the distributive
preferences. For respondents with same-sex partners, the follow-
ing indicators were each positively associated with a preference for
having the partner's child receive a larger share of the decedent's
estate than if that indicator did not apply to the respondent's
committed relationship: naming a partner as health-care deci-
sionmaker; exchanging a symbol of the relationship, such as a ring
or other jewelry; and registering the committed relationship. 338
For respondents with opposite-sex partners, the following indica-
tors were each positively associated with a preference for having
336. See supra notes 238-247 and accompanying text.
337. See Scenario G supra p. 76.
338. Each indicator has the following gamma: named partner as health care de-
cisionmaker (y=. 3 4); exchanged a symbol of the relationship (y-. 3 5 ); registered the
committed relationship (y=.4 9 ).
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the partner's child receive a larger share of the decedent's estate
than if that indicator did not apply to the respondent's committed
relationship: naming a partner as health-care decisionmaker; ex-
changing a symbol of the relationship, such as a ring or other jew-
elry; and making joint charitable contributions. 339 For this sample
group, the duration of the relationship was also positively associ-
ated with a preference for giving the partner's child a greater
share of the estate. Although there were too few cases to consider
several of these indicators alone for the respondents with opposite-
sex partners, additional analysis was conducted based on the
common themes described earlier.3 4" All five themes were posi-
tively associated with a preference for having the partner's child
receive a greater share of the estate. In other words, having at
least one of the symbolic indicators, one of the indicators repre-
senting present and future planning, one of the indicators of finan-
cial interdependence, one of the deathtime arrangements or one of
the indicators pertaining to life insurance and joint ownership was
positively associated with a preference for having the partner'9
child receive a greater share of the decedent's estate.
The findings suggest that the nature of the committed rela-
tionship may play a role in the nature of the relationship between
a decedent and a partner's child from a prior relationship. This
study further shows that an investigation of both the relationship
of the committed couple and the relationship of the decedent to the
partner's child is necessary for developing an intestacy statute
that is responsive to family units headed by committed partners.
The Waggoner Working Draft recognizes these interconnections
when it includes co-parenting arrangements as a factor for finding
a committed relationship. 341 The correctness of this direction
taken by the Draft cannot be doubted. Several issues need more
extensive investigation: (1) what factors about the committed rela-
tionship and the relationship between the decedent and the part-
ner's child should affect the share passing to a committed partner;
(2) what parent-child relationship factors, other than co-parenting
arrangements, should be taken into account in defining a commit-
ted relationship; and (3) what factors about the committed rela-
339. Each indicator has the following gamma: named partner as health care
decisionmaker (y=. 7 6 ); exchanged a symbol of the relationship (y-. 6 7 ); made joint
charitable gifts (y=.6 8 ); length of relationship (y-.3 7 ); symbolic indicators (y-. 8 3 );
financial interdependence indicators (y=.69); life planning indicators (y-. 4 8 ); death-
time plans indicators (y=.5 7 ); life insurance and joint ownership indicators (y-.41).
340. See supra notes 238-247 and accompanying text.
341. See Appendix, §§ (d)(4), (e)(4), infra p. 93.
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tionship and the relationship between the decedent and the part-
ner's child might justify including a partner's child as an heir?
Conclusion
Table 14, which immediately follows the Appendix, summa-
rizes the results of the empirical study through a comparison of
the intestate share to the committed partner under the Hawaii
legislation, the Waggoner Working Draft and the plurality prefer-
ences of the respondents in each sample group. There are four
major findings of the empirical study designed to assess public at-
titudes about including a committed partner as an heir:
1. A substantial majority of the respondents in each sample
group consistently preferred the partner to take a share of the de-
cedent's estate. Respondents with same-sex partners, however,
were consistently more generous to partners than were respon-
dents from the general public sample or the respondents with op-
posite-sex partners.
2. The respondents in each sample group consistently pre-
ferred same-sex and opposite-sex committed couples to be treated
the same under the inheritance laws.
3. Committed relationships for purposes of an inheritance
law can be identified through easily observable attributes and
those attributes are shown to be associated with a preference for
having a partner share in a decedent's estate.
4. The respondents consistently recognized the social ties be-
tween the decedent and the partner's child for inheritance pur-
poses.
Nearly every area of the law treats married persons differ-
ently than single persons. Whether we look to the law of taxation,
immigration, welfare, evidence, property, employee benefits or
torts, the marital status of a person frequently determines legal
outcome. 342 The law in most states generally ignores committed
relationships and family units headed by committed partners.343
To be legally invisible means that the law treats committed part-
ners as if they were strangers to each other. Sometimes, to protect
the individual economic interests of one partner, the courts have
accorded partners the status of business associates, but they often
342. See generally Chambers, supra note 94 (describing the legal consequences
of marriage and considering the effects these laws would have on same-sex couples
if they had the right to marry).
343. But see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2) (1994) (recognizing opposite-sex com-
mitted couples, but reducing the amount of Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
that would otherwise be available to the partners if each applied separately).
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do so by severing the intimate nature of the relationship from the
parties' economic entanglements. 344 This Article looked at one
type of state regulation, the intestacy law, and explored the ques-
tion of recognizing committed partners as heirs.
In some respects, a change in the intestacy statute has only
limited implications for other areas of inheritance law and other
areas of the law in general. It may, for example, affect the inter-
pretation of other statutory provisions that refer to "heirs," such as
section 2-711 of the Uniform Probate Code, which adopts a rule of
construction for determining heirs under a statute or governing
instrument.345 For the most part, however, in the absence of fur-
ther statutory change, other aspects of the inheritance law would
remain unaffected. For example, giving a committed partner heir-
ship rights does not mean that the partner would be protected
from disinheritance under conventional statutes having to do with
the elective share346 or the omitted spouse. 347
In other respects, however, changing the intestacy statutes to
allow a committed partner to share in the decedent's estate could
potentially have substantial legal, social and political effects. Rec-
ognition within intestacy statutes has consistently had the effect of
shaping, as well as reflecting, societal norms and values and the
344. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (explaining how the law
treats committed relationships at the time of dissolution). For cases taking into
account the intimate nature of the relationship, see supra note 234.
345. Section 2-711 of the Uniform Probate Code defines heirs of a designated
person to mean those persons who would inherit under the applicable intestacy
statute if the designated individual died when the disposition is to take effect in
possession or enjoyment. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-711 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A.
203-04 (Supp. 1997). This construction avoids having the property distributed to
persons who predeceased the time of possession or enjoyment. See id. Notably,
the statute provides that "[i]f the designated individual's surviving spouse is living
but is remarried at the time the disposition is to take effect in possession or en-
joyment, the surviving spouse is not an heir of the designated individual." Id. In
the absence of statutory amendment, this statutory limitation on the legal spouse's
right to take would not apply to a committed partner who marries. In the absence
of a statutory amendment, this limitation would not apply to either a legal spouse
or a committed partner who enters into a committed relationship subsequent to
the individual person's death. The Hawaii legislature has amended its statute to
apply to a reciprocal beneficiary. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-711 (Michie
Supp. 1997) (addressing the situation where the spouse or the reciprocal benefici-
ary marries after the decedent's death, but not where the spouse or reciprocal
beneficiary enters into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship after the decedent's
death).
346. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201 to -214 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A.
121-46 (Supp. 1997).
347. See, e.g., id. § 2-301, 8 U.L.A. 46-47.
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definition of family itself.348 Gender equality would be unthink-
able within a legal system that embraced primogeniture. Recogni-
tion of adopted children as heirs of an adopting parent's ancestors
and collateral relatives ultimately broke the stranglehold blood
ties had on the definition of family and makes it possible for this
Article to even speculate on the possibility of including as an heir
of a decedent a partner's child who is not a child of the decedent.349
Allowing a committed partner to inherit under an intestacy
statute would not only have an effect on how others view family
units headed by committed partners, but it would likely have an
effect on how members of the family unit view themselves. Just as
legal invisibility currently shapes the internal dynamics of the
family unit, recognition inevitably will shape the relations of the
partners to each other and to their children.350 Although the full
extent of the effect of this change on family units headed by com-
mitted partners is difficult to know, what is easy to predict is that
it will be profound in different ways for opposite-sex and same-sex
couples.
348. Cf. Jane S. Schacter, "Counted Among the Blessed:" One Court and the
Constitution of Family, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1996). Although Professor
Schacter acknowledges the "perils" of establishing criteria based on traditional
heterosexual families for second-parent adoptions, she recognizes that linking
same-sex couples to traditional family rhetoric is necessary for "creating social and
legal conditions that can support an evolving array of diversely configured lesbian
and gay-and other-families." See id.
349. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 114-15
(Supp. 1997) (providing for reciprocal inheritance rights between adopted children
and their adoptive families).
350. Interviewers asked respondents with opposite-sex partners two questions
to assess how a change in the intestacy law might affect their willingness or un-
willingness to marry. In the first question, the interviewers asked: "If a new law
gave you the same rights to inherit that married couples have, would you be more
likely to marry, less likely to marry or would it have no effect?" In the second ques-
tion, the interviewers asked: "If instead a new law gave you some but not all of
the rights to inherit that married couples have, would you be more likely to marry,
less likely to marry or would it have no effect?" The overwhelming majority of the
respondents for both questions (90.6%) indicated that it would have no effect.
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Appendix
Waggoner Working Draft
Intestate Share of Committed Partner
(January 20, 1995)
(a) [Amount.] If an unmarried, adult decedent dies without a
valid will and leaves a surviving committed partner, the decedent's
surviving committed partner is entitled to:
(1) the first [$50,000], plus one-half of any balance of the in-
testate estate, if:
(i) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the dece-
dent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also de-
scendants of the surviving committed partner and there is no other
descendant of the surviving committed partner who survives the
decedent;
(2) one-half of the intestate estate, in cases not covered by
paragraph (1).
(b) [Committed Partner; Requirements.] To be the decedent's
committed partner, the individual must, at the decedent's death:
(i) have been an unmarried adult; (ii) not have been prohibited
from marrying the decedent under the law of this state by reason
of a blood relationship to the decedent; and (iii) have been sharing
a common household with the decedent in a marriage-like rela-
tionship. Only one individual can qualify as the decedent's com-
mitted partner for purposes of this section.
(c) [Common Household.] For purposes of subsections (b) and
(e), "sharing a common household" or "shared a common house-
hold" means that the decedent and the individual shared the same
place to live, whether or not one or both had other places to live
and whether or not one or both were physically residing some-
where else at the decedent's death. The right to occupy the com-
mon household need not have been in both of their names.
(d) [Marriage-like Relationship; Factors.] For purposes of
subsection (b), a "marriage-like relationship" is a relationship that
corresponds to the relationship between marital partners, in which
two individuals have chosen to share one another's lives in a long-
term, intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring. Al-
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though no single factor or set of factors determines whether a rela-
tionship qualifies as marriage-like, the following factors are among
those to be considered:
(1) the purpose, duration, constancy and degree of exclusivity
of the relationship;
(2) the degree to which the parties intermingled their fi-
nances, such as by maintaining joint checking, credit card, or other
types of accounts, sharing loan obligations, sharing a mortgage or
lease on the household in which they lived or on other property, or
titling the household in which they lived or other property in joint
tenancy;
(3) the degree to which the parties formalized legal obliga-
tions, intentions and responsibilities to one another, such as by one
or both naming the other as primary beneficiary of life insurance
or employee benefit plans or as agent to make health care deci-
sions;
(4) whether the couple shared in co-parenting a child and the
degree of joint care and support given the child;
(5) whether the couple joined in a marriage or a commitment
ceremony, even if the ceremony was not of a type giving rise to a
presumption under subsection (e)(3); and
(6) the degree to which the couple held themselves out to oth-
ers as married or the degree to which the couple held themselves
out to others as emotionally and financially committed to one an-
other on a permanent basis.
(e) [Presumption.] An individual's relationship with the dece-
dent is presumed to have been marriage-like if:
(1) during the [six] year period next preceding the decedent's
death, the decedent and the individual shared a common house-
hold for periods totaling at least [five] years;
(2) the decedent or the individual registered or designated
the other as his [or her] domestic partner with and under proce-
dures established by an organization and neither partner executed
a document terminating or purporting to terminate the registra-
tion or designation;
(3) the decedent and the individual joined in a marriage or a
commitment ceremony conducted and contemporaneously certified
in writing by an organization; or
(4) the individual is the parent of a child of the decedent, or is
or was a party to a written co-parenting agreement with the dece-
dent regarding a child, and if, in either case, the child lived before
the age of 18 in the common household of the decedent and the in-
dividual.
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(f) [Force of the Presumption]. If a presumption arises under
subsection (e) because only one of the listed factors is established,
the presumption is rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence.
If more than one of the listed factors is established, the presump-
tion can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Table 14: A Comparison of the Intestate Share to the
Spouse under the UPC, to the Spouse and Same-Sex
Partner under the Hawaii Probate Code, to the Partner
under the Waggoner Working Draft, and to the Partner
under the Plurality Preferences of the Respondents in
Each Sample Group
Family Cir- UPC § 2-102 Waggoner General Respondents Respondents
cumstances Share to Working Public with Oppo- with Same-
Spouse Draft Share Sample site-Sex Sex Partners
HAW. REV. to Partner Share to Partners Share to
STAT. ANN. Partner Share to Partner
§ 560:2-102 Partner
Share to
Same-Sex
Partner and
ISpouse
No children the entire $50,000 plus one-half of one-half of the entire
or parent estate one-half of the estate the estate estate
(Scenario B) any balance (41.2%) (33.3%) (68.7%)
of the estate,
the entire
estate
(30.3%)
All decedent's the entire $50,000 plus n/a n/a n/a
children are estate one-half of
also children of any balance
thespouse/ of the estate
partner and
thespouse
partner has no
other children
No children $200,000 one-half of one-half of one-half of the entire
but parent plus three- the estate the estate the estate estate
(Scenario A) fourths of (45.3%) (42.4%) (64.7%)
any balance
of the estate the entire
estate
(30.3%)
1. For intestate decedents with relatively modest estates, their committed
partners receive all or nearly all of their estates.
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All dece- $150,000 one-half of one-half of one-third of one-half of
dent's chil- plus one-half the estate the estate the estate the estate
dren are also of any bal- (27.6%) with other (36.1%)
children of ance of the two-thirds
the spouse/ estate none (27.6% divided the entire
partner and with nearly equally be- estate
the spouse/ two-thirds of tween own (24.8%)
partner also this propor- child and
has other tion of the child of part-
children respondents ner (28.1%)
(Scenario H) giving some
share to the one-half of
partner's the estate
child) (18.8%)
one-third of
the estate
with the
other two-
thirds di-
vided equally
between own
child and
child of part-
ner (24.1%)
One or more $100,000 one-half of one-half of one-half of one-half of
of the dece- plus one-half the estate the estate the estate the estate
dent's chil- of any bal- (38.4%) (42.4%) (57.3%)
dren are not ance of the
children of estate none (37.2%) none (30.3%)
the spouse/
partner less than
(Scenario C) half of the
estate but
more than
zero (24.2%)
(Scenario D) Widower/ Widower/ Widower/
Widow died Widow died Widow died
first: one- first: one- first: one-
half of the half of the half of the
estate estate estate
(41.0M39.0%) (39.4%/39.4%) (41.9%/40.3%)
Widower/ Widower/ Widower/
Widow died Widow died Widow died
first: none first: none first: the
(28.9% 30.5%) (24 2%&.2%) entire estate
(26.4%/26.4%)
Widower/ Widower/
Widow died Widow died
first: the first: less
entire estate than half of
(21.2%/21.2%) the estate
but more
than zero
(18.6%120.2%)

